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ABSTRACT: Immigration officials take two approaches to unauthorized
immigrants: Either they seek to deport them, or they exercise prosecutorial
discretion, allowing certain categories of unauthorized immigrants to remain
in the United States without legal status. Neither method is working. The
executive lacks the resources to remove more than a small percentage of the
unauthorized population each year, and prosecutorial discretion is by
definition an impermanent solution that leaves unauthorized immigrants
vulnerable to exploitation at both work and home—harming not just them,
but also the legal immigrants and U.S. citizens with whom they live and work.
This Article suggests a third way. Immigration officials could supplement the
current removal-or-forbearance dichotomy with a cooperative-enforcement
approach, under which they would assist those unauthorized immigrants who
are low priorities for removal to legalize their status. Administrative law
scholars have long promoted cooperative enforcement in other fields,
describing how administrative agencies have begun to replace the rigid,
adversarial, command-and-control regime that dominated the regulatory
environment in the 1970s and 1980s with a collaborative approach to
rulemaking and enforcement. Just as officials at other federal agencies now
work with regulated entities to help them come into compliance with federal
law, immigration officials could also employ a combination of outreach and
education, flexible interpretation of regulations and statutes, and the liberal
exercise of their discretion to assist unauthorized immigrants apply for, and
obtain, legal status.
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INTRODUCTION

On June 23, 2016, an eight-member Supreme Court announced that it
had deadlocked in United States v. Texas,1 one of the most important
1.

United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam).

A1_FROST.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

11/7/2017 2:28 PM

COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT IN IMMIGRATION LAW

3

immigration cases in decades.2 Texas and 25 other states had challenged the
Obama Administration’s blanket exercise of prosecutorial discretion granting
a temporary reprieve from removal to millions of unauthorized immigrants.
Although the tie vote set no precedent, it kept in place the lower court’s
nationwide preliminary injunction and, together with the election of Donald
J. Trump to be the next president, sounded the death knell for Obama’s
initiative.3 The case exemplifies the problems with the longstanding
dichotomy in immigration enforcement, in which immigration officials
believe they have only two choices: deport unauthorized immigrants or
exercise prosecutorial discretion, allowing certain categories of unauthorized
immigrants to remain in the United States without legal status.
This Article suggests a third way: The immigration bureaucracy could
adopt a cooperative enforcement model similar to that used by other federal
agencies, under which government officials would proactively assist a subset
of unauthorized immigrants come into compliance with the law.
Administrative law scholars have long promoted cooperative enforcement in
other fields, arguing that administrative agencies should replace the rigid,
adversarial, command-and-control regime that dominated the regulatory
environment in the 1970s and 1980s with a collaborative approach to
rulemaking and enforcement.4 Over the past 20 years, agencies such as the

2. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court vs. the President, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/04/opinion/the-supreme-court-vs-the-president.html (describing
the case as presenting a “blockbuster constitutional question”); Dara Lind, United States v. Texas, the
Biggest Immigration Case in a Century, Explained, VOX (Apr. 15, 2016, 10:50 AM), http://www.vox.
com/2016/4/15/11424614/supreme-court-immigration-dapa-daca; Adam Liptak & Michael D.
Shear, Supreme Court Tie Blocks Obama Immigration Plan, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016), https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/06/24/us/supreme-court-immigration-obama-dapa.html (describing the Court’s
decision in United States v. Texas as “perhaps [the Supreme Court’s] most important statement this
term”).
3. See Liptak & Shear, supra note 2 (stating that the Court’s decision “effectively end[ed]”
President Obama’s deferred action initiatives).
4. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 5 (1992) (promoting responsive regulation in which agencies emphasize
“flexibility,” “participat[ion],” and “negotiation” with regulated entities rather than the top-down,
“punitive” and “repressive” regulatory style of the past); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION 29 (2002) (explaining that responsive regulation should be used
“in deciding whether a more or less interventionist response is needed”); Jody Freeman,
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4–7 (1997) (describing new
methods of regulation in which agencies shift away from adversarial enforcement and toward
cooperation with regulated entities); Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich H. Earnhart, Depiction of the
Regulator-Regulated Entity Relationship in the Chemical Industry: Deterrence-Based vs. Cooperative
Enforcement, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 603, 611–44 (2007) (discussing the benefits
of cooperative enforcement over punitive, command-and-control style regulation); Kristin E.
Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in the Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 1151, 1160 (2010) (explaining that one theory of enforcement assumes that “regulated
parties want to comply with the law and will respond more positively to persuasion, education,
and assistance than to penalties”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age of
Collaboration, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 555, 557 (describing criticism of the “command-and-control”
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Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”), the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”), the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have adopted
initiatives to work together with regulated entities to assist them in coming
into compliance with the law through education, consultation, and flexible
interpretations of legal standards.5 The immigration bureaucracy could do
the same.
The Immigration and Nationality Act contains a number of provisions
permitting unauthorized immigrants to apply for legal status. For example,
some unauthorized immigrants who are under 21 years of age, and who can
show that they have been abused, abandoned, or neglected by one or both
parents, are eligible to obtain legal status and eventually citizenship.6
Likewise, certain unauthorized immigrants who are victims of human
trafficking or other serious crimes, and who are willing to assist law
enforcement officers, can obtain visas allowing them to stay in the United
States indefinitely and eventually adjust to lawful permanent resident (“LPR”)
status and citizenship.7 Many unauthorized immigrants have a spouse or child
who is a U.S. citizen or LPR, rendering them eligible for exceptions or waivers
to the general prohibition against adjustment of status by those who entered
the United States illegally.8 Studies have shown that a significant percentage
of unauthorized immigrants qualify for at least one of these methods of
obtaining legal status, but that most are unaware of it and, in any case, would
find it difficult to navigate the complex process of applying and then proving
their eligibility.9 The government could help them do so through education,
regulatory model); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 343 (2004) (“Administrative agencies at the
federal and state levels are increasingly promoting outreach programs and issuing nonbinding
guidelines in lieu of their traditional top-down rule promulgation, implementation, and
enforcement activities.”); Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13
YALE J. ON REG. 535, 537–39 (1996) (discussing cooperative implementation programs and their
benefits); Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy S. Rabinowitz, Punishment Versus Cooperation in Regulatory
Enforcement: A Case Study of OSHA, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 713, 715–16 (1997) (discussing the benefits
of regulators combining punishment with cooperation).
5. See infra Part III.A.
6. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J) (2012).
7. Id. § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (granting immigration visas to victims of
certain crimes, including human trafficking, who meet other qualifications); id. § 101(a)(15)(T),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (granting immigration visas to victims of human trafficking who meet other
qualifications).
8. See, e.g., Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://
www.uscis.gov/family/family-us-citizens/provisional-waiver/provisional-unlawful-presence-waivers
(last updated Sept. 13, 2016).
9. Tom K. Wong et al., Paths to Lawful Immigration Status: Results and Implications from the
PERSON Survey, 2 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 287, 287 (2014) (surveying 67 legal service
providers assisting applicants for deferred action for childhood arrivals, and finding that 14.3%
of the unauthorized immigrants applying for this temporary forbearance were also eligible for a
more permanent form of relief); see also infra notes 199–204 and accompanying text.
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assistance, adoption of streamlined, user-friendly procedures, and the liberal
exercise of discretion, just as federal agencies such as OSHA, FDA, EPA, and
SEC regularly assist the entities and individuals they regulate come into
compliance with federal law.10
Many of the arguments in favor of cooperative enforcement in other
fields apply just as strongly to immigration. As in other regulatory contexts,
the use of adversarial, command-and-control style enforcement of
immigration law is both costly and inefficient. On average, it costs
approximately $12,000 to remove a single unauthorized immigrant,11 and the
immigration bureaucracy has the resources to remove only about 4% of the
undocumented population each year.12 Deportation alone cannot solve the
nation’s unauthorized immigration problems, just as enforcement actions
alone cannot ensure compliance with environmental or workplace safety laws
and regulations. Immigration officials could choose instead to follow the lead
of regulators at federal agencies such as the EPA and OSHA, who have
concluded that they can more efficiently achieve broader compliance
through cooperation than through coercion.13
For the most part, the immigration bureaucracy has not adopted the
collaborative governance initiatives embraced by much of the rest of the
administrative state. Immigration enforcement agencies such as U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (“CBP”) remain focused on adversarial, command-andcontrol style enforcement, implemented through increased use of detention
and removal; they seem to view the laws and regulations that permit
unauthorized immigrants to regularize their status as loopholes to be applied
narrowly rather than legitimate paths to legalization.14 Legal scholars have
also failed to apply the cooperative enforcement lens to the field of
immigration regulation and enforcement, perhaps because immigration law

10. See Amanda Frost, The Overlooked Pathways to Legal Status, THE ATLANTIC (June 19, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/the-overlooked-pathways-to-legal-status/
487682.
11. David Rogers, At Stake in Immigration Debate: Billions of Dollars, POLITICO (Feb. 10, 2015, 5:35
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/02/immigration-debate-price-115050 (reporting DHS
statistics on the costs of deportation).
12. Brief for the Petitioners at 4, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (No. 15-674), 2016
WL 836758 (“[I]n any given year, more than 95% of the undocumented population will not be
removed . . . .”); The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of
Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op.
O.L.C., at 1 (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/file/179206/download (“DHS has
explained that although there are approximately 11.3 million undocumented aliens in the
country, it has the resources to remove fewer than 400,000 such aliens each year.”).
13. See Frost, supra note 10.
14. See infra notes 103–14 and accompanying text.
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is often viewed as exceptional, and thus outside the mainstream jurisprudence
in constitutional and administrative law.15
Nor, at first glance, would the Trump Administration seem likely to
embrace the idea of using cooperative enforcement techniques in the
immigration context. Trump’s campaign rhetoric expressed hostility to all
unauthorized immigrants, without drawing distinctions between recently
arrived criminal aliens and long-term, law-abiding unauthorized immigrants.
At various points during his campaign, he vowed to remove all of the
approximately 11.3 million unauthorized immigrants in the United States
within two years of taking office.16 If the Trump Administration’s primary goal
is to instill fear in the immigrant population and appeal to anti-immigrant
constituents, then Trump’s immigration officials would likely reject
cooperative enforcement because it would send the wrong message to both
groups.
Since his election, however, Trump has backed away from his initial
intention to deport the entire unauthorized population, perhaps in light of
the practical difficulties and high cost of mass deportations.17 Trump has
acknowledged that he will need to set “priorities” in immigration
enforcement,18 and, in particular, that he will focus on removing
unauthorized immigrants with criminal backgrounds.19 He issued an
Executive Order on January 25, 2017, stating that his administration would
prioritize the removal of unauthorized immigrants who have committed
crimes, thus implicitly acknowledging that those without a criminal history

15. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration
Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (1999) (defining immigration exceptionalism “as
the view that immigration and alienage law should be exempt from the usual limits on
government decisionmaking”); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration
Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965, 1968 (2013) (describing how immigration law “stand[s]
apart in both its procedural and substantive aspects”); David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan
Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 593 (2017) (describing how
immigration is often viewed as falling outside “mainstream legal norms”).
16. Julia Preston et al., What Would It Take for Donald Trump to Deport 11 Million and Build a
Wall?, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/20/us/politics/donaldtrump-immigration.html.
17. Id. (reporting that it would cost approximately $400 billion to remove all unauthorized
immigrants from the United States over 20 years); see also Eric Bradner, Ryan: ‘We Are Not Planning on
Erecting a Deportation Force,’ CNN (Nov. 13, 2016, 3:10 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/13/
politics/paul-ryan-donald-trump-obamacare-deportation-force (“We are not planning on erecting a
deportation force. . . . I think we should put people’s minds at ease . . . . That is not what we’re focused
on.”).
18. Donald J. Trump, Presidential Campaign Speech on Immigration Policy in Phoenix, Arizona
(Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-donald-trump-immigration-speechtranscript-20160831-snap-htmlstory.html.
19. Interview by Lesley Stahl with Donald J. Trump, President-Elect of the United States, in
New York, NY (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-Donald-trumpfamily-melania-ivanka-lesley-stahl.
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would not be targeted.20 Perhaps most important, Congress has not yet shown
any willingness to significantly increase resources for immigration
enforcement. Accordingly, the Trump Administration—like the Obama and
Bush Administrations before it—will have to continue to prioritize the
removal of some unauthorized immigrants while allowing the rest to remain
in the United States. In light of this reality, allowing immigration officials to
help certain unauthorized immigrants take advantage of existing pathways to
legal status might appeal as a way of reducing the unauthorized population
without expending resources, harming the economy, or granting an
amnesty—and all in accordance with the rule of law.
Significantly, cooperative enforcement can be tailored to the individual
policy preferences of each presidential administration. Some administrations
might prefer to prioritize deportation of those immigrants who are convicted
felons, while allowing more highly educated unauthorized immigrants, who
could benefit the economy, to stay. Others might prioritize removal of recent
border crossers, while permitting unauthorized immigrants who are the
parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs, or who have lived in the United States for
over ten years, to remain.21 Moreover, unless Congress radically increases the
resources for enforcement, any administration—even one that seeks to
restrict immigration flows and remove as many unauthorized immigrants as
possible—will have to make enforcement choices. The executive can make
these enforcement choices permanent, as well as reduce the total number of
unauthorized immigrants, by assisting unauthorized immigrants who are low
priorities for removal to regularize their status.22
Cooperative enforcement is both more legally defensible and politically
palatable than the extensive use of prosecutorial discretion. President
Obama’s efforts to systemize and expand prosecutorial discretion were widely
criticized as antithetical to the rule of law,23 and were bogged down in

20. President Trump’s January 25, 2017 Executive Order, “Enhancing Public Safety in the
Interior of the United States,” prioritizes the removal of any unauthorized immigrant who has
been convicted of, charged with, or “committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal
offense”; or “pose[s] a risk to public safety or national security,” but does not prioritize the
removal of unauthorized immigrants solely on the basis of their lack of documented status. Exec.
Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 25, 2017). However, the Executive Order may
prioritize removal of unauthorized immigrants who entered the country illegally (as opposed to
overstay their visas), since entry without inspection is a crime under 8 U.S.C. § 1325.
21. SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 14–32 (2015) (describing the history of prosecutorial
discretion in immigration law).
22. Admittedly, a president whose sole goal is to make life as uncomfortable and difficult as
possible for all unauthorized immigrants—regardless of the lack of resources to remove them,
and the fact that their vulnerable status negatively effects the labor market for U.S. citizens—
would not embrace this proposal. See infra Part IV (discussing incompatibility of cooperative
enforcement and the theory of attrition through enforcement).
23. See, e.g., Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671,
746 (2014) (“Substantial nonenforcement of federal statutes clouds public perception of what
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litigation for years. Texas and 25 other states sued the administration, arguing
that the executive’s proposal to forgo enforcement of immigration laws on a
broad, categorical basis was at odds with the Immigration and Nationality Act
and the Administrative Procedure Act, and violated the president’s
constitutional obligation to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”24
The district court entered a nationwide preliminary injunction, halting the
program, which was affirmed by both the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit and an eight-member Supreme Court’s tie vote.25 As a result,
the initiative did not go into effect during the Obama Administration. In
contrast, a cooperative enforcement policy seeks to use existing laws to assist
unauthorized immigrants to regularize their status, and thus cannot be
attacked as lawless or an abuse of executive power.
To be sure, cooperative enforcement is not a cure-all for the nation’s
unauthorized immigration crisis, nor will it be positively received in all
quarters. Cooperative-enforcement techniques would likely legalize no more
than 10% of the unauthorized population, leaving millions in the same illegal
status.26 Moreover, any administration implementing such a policy risks
criticism for “rewarding lawbreakers” by helping unauthorized immigrants to
obtain legal status—the same criticism initially leveled against federal
agencies such as the EPA, OSHA, and FDA when they first engaged in similar
cooperative enforcement techniques.27 And cooperative enforcement would
likely be opposed by proponents of “attrition through enforcement”—the
policy of encouraging self-deportation through vigorous enforcement of laws
and policies making life difficult for unauthorized immigrants, which the
Trump Administration has, at times, appeared to support.28 In short,
cooperative immigration enforcement is not a panacea, or a substitute for a
conduct is unlawful, thus impairing rule-of-law values and diminishing Congress’s political
accountability for the range of conduct it has proscribed.”); House Rebukes Obama on Immigration,
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014, 10:05 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/nation/houserebukes-obama-on-immigration/2209064 (reporting Representative Steve Scalise’s assertion that
President Obama’s broad grants of deferred action violated the rule of law); Press Release, John
A. Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives, “An Affront to the Rule of Law and to the
Constitution Itself” (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/affront-rule-law-andconstitution-itself (describing deferred action as an “executive overreach” that “is an affront to
the rule of law and to the Constitution itself”).
24. See Brief for the State Respondent at 71–77, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271
(2016) (No. 15-674), 2016 WL 1213267.
25. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th
Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
26. See infra Part IV.B (discussing categories of unauthorized immigrants who could legalize
their status under a cooperative enforcement approach).
27. Freeman, supra note 4, at 93 (describing objections to collaborative enforcement initiatives
by the EPA and others, which some feared would lead companies to “exploit such experiments in an
effort to circumvent environmental regulation to the maximum extent possible”).
28. See generally JESSICA M. VAUGHAN, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, ATTRITION THROUGH
ENFORCEMENT: A COST-EFFECTIVE STRATEGY TO SHRINK THE ILLEGAL POPULATION (2006), https://cis.
org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2006/back406.pdf.
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comprehensive legislative overhaul of U.S. immigration law. But it would be
an improvement over the deeply flawed removal-or-forbearance dichotomy
employed today, and it is grounded in a quarter-century tradition in which
federal agencies have moved away from adversarial command-and-control
style enforcement and towards a flexible, cooperative relationship with
regulated entities.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II outlines the weaknesses of the
removal-or-forbearance model that dominates immigration enforcement
today. Part III surveys the academic literature promoting collaborative
governance techniques, such as cooperative enforcement, and describes how
this approach is employed by federal agencies in other regulatory fields. This
Part then explains how cooperative enforcement would work as a practical
matter in the field of immigration law. It describes the existing statutes and
regulations that permit unauthorized immigrants to regularize their status—
in many cases creating a pathway to citizenship—and explains how
immigration officials could employ the hallmarks of cooperative
enforcement, such as education and outreach, assistance, flexible
interpretation of legal standards, and liberal use of discretion to enable
unauthorized immigrants to take advantage of these laws.
Part IV shifts from the descriptive to the normative, discussing the costs
and benefits of cooperative enforcement in the field of immigration law, and
anticipating critics who would likely claim that assisting immigration
lawbreakers is antithetical to immigration enforcement. This Part also
speculates as to why a regulatory tool employed successfully in other fields has
yet to be embraced—or even discussed—in the context of immigration
enforcement, and concludes that cooperative enforcement might help to
bring immigration law back into the fold of mainstream administrative law
and practice.
II.

THE FAILURE OF THE REMOVAL-OR-FORBEARANCE APPROACH

In legal briefs, policy statements, and testimony before Congress, U.S.
immigration officials have consistently stated that their goal is to reduce the
size of the unauthorized population while at the same time taking into
account humanitarian, economic, and national security concerns.29 To
29. See Brief for the United States at 14, Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (No.
11-182), 2012 WL 939048 (“In the [Immigration and Nationality Act], Congress vested the
Executive Branch with the authority and the discretion to make sensitive judgments with respect
to aliens, balancing the numerous considerations involved: national security, law enforcement,
foreign policy, humanitarian considerations, and the rights of law-abiding citizens and aliens.”);
see also FY 2017 Budget Request for U.S. Customs and Border Protection & U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Appropriations & Subcomm. on Homeland Sec., 114th Cong.
(2016) (written testimony of ICE Deputy Director Daniel Ragsdale), https://www.dhs.gov/news/
2016/03/08/written-testimony-ice-deputy-director-senate-appropriations-subcommittee-homeland
(“[D]edicated officers enforce our nation’s immigration laws by identifying aliens amenable to
removal, apprehending, detaining, and removing those individuals from the United States, consistent
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accomplish this goal, the immigration bureaucracy has taken a dual approach:
A small percentage of unauthorized immigrants are targeted for removal,
while the large majority are categorized as low enforcement priorities.30
Immigration officials will not seek out individuals categorized as low
enforcement priorities for removal, and will sometimes choose to forgo
removal even when these unauthorized immigrants come to their attention.31
In his January 25, 2017, Executive Order entitled “Enhancing Public
Safety in the Interior of the United States,” President Trump announced that
he would continue the removal-or-forbearance approach—albeit using
harsher rhetoric and expanding the categories of immigrants who are
enforcement priorities.32 The Executive Order prioritized for removal all
those who committed crimes, not just those convicted of serious crimes as had
been the case under the Obama Administration.33 The Executive Order also
stated that any unauthorized immigrant who came to immigration officials’
attention is at risk for removal, even if that person would not otherwise be a
removal priority.34 Implicit in both these statements, however, was the
concession that law-abiding unauthorized immigrants living in the interior of
the United States are not targets for removal, which means that they are
unlikely to be placed in deportation proceedings.
Yet by virtually all accounts, removal-or-forbearance has failed. Currently,
11.3 million unauthorized immigrants live in the United States, an increase
from 3.5 million in 1990.35 Removal is expensive, disruptive, frequently
inhumane, and cannot keep pace with the burgeoning unauthorized
population. Forbearance leaves unauthorized immigrants to live and work in
the United States without legal status, making them vulnerable to exploitation
while simultaneously undermining wage and labor conditions for legal
immigrants and U.S. citizens. The unfortunate result is a record number of
deportations, coupled with a record-high percentage of unauthorized

with DHS priorities . . . [such as] those who pose a threat to national security, public safety and on
recent unlawful entrants.”).
30. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 12, at 3–4 (explaining that “[l]imited
appropriations make broad discretion [in immigration enforcement] a practical necessity,” and
noting that “in any given year, more than 95% of the undocumented population will not be
removed”); President Barack Obama, Remarks on the Supreme Court Decision in United States v.
Texas (June 23, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/23/
remarks-president-supreme-court-decision-us-versus-texas (describing the Obama Administration’s
immigration enforcement priorities).
31. Obama, supra note 30 (“As long as you have not committed a crime, our limited
immigration enforcement resources are not focused on you.”).
32. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
33. Id. at 8800.
34. Id.
35. JEFFREY S. PASSEL ET AL., AS GROWTH STALLS, UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION
BECOMES MORE SETTLED 4 (2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2014/09/2014-09-03_
Unauthorized-Final.pdf.
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immigrants putting down roots in the United States—both a cause for serious
concern.
A. THE FAILURE OF REMOVAL
Detention and removal as a means of enforcing immigration laws has
increased dramatically over the last two decades. In 1995, 85,730 immigrants
were detained;36 by 2013, the detained numbered 441,000.37 In 1990, there
were 30,039 removals from the United States; by 2015, that number reached
462,463.38 During the eight years of President Obama’s administration,
immigration authorities set a record of 2.4 million removals,39 and that
number will likely climb quickly in a Trump Administration.
Enforcement of immigration law through targeted removal is expensive
and requires the investment of considerable resources. CBP takes the lead in
enforcing immigration laws against noncitizens who seek to enter the United
States without permission.40 The Border Patrol has expanded from 3,715
officers in 199041 to over 19,000 officers today.42 Between 2003 and 2013,
funding for CBP doubled from $5.9 billion to $11.9 billion.43 For those
unauthorized immigrants in the interior of the United States, enforcement
falls within the jurisdiction of ICE, which has also doubled in size. Funding
for ICE rose from $3.3 billion in 2003 to $5.9 billion in 2013, and the number
of ICE agents assigned to Enforcement and Removal Operations more than
doubled from 2,710 to 6,338.44
Despite the record expenditures and the record number of removals,
immigration enforcement cannot keep pace with the size of the unauthorized
36. DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A
FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 126 (2013), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf.
37. JOHN F. SIMANSKI, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013, at
1 (2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf.
38. Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the
United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states.
39. Julia Preston, Low-Priority Immigrants Still Swept Up in Net of Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (June
24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/us/low-priority-immigrants-still-swept-up-innet-of-deportation.html.
40. See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, About CBP, https://www.cbp.gov/about.
41. See MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 36, at 18.
42. Brian Naylor, Trump’s Plan to Hire 15,000 Border Patrol and ICE Agents Won’t Be Easy, NPR
(Feb. 23, 2017, 5:12 AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/23/516712980/trumps-plan-to-hire15-000-border-patrol-and-ice-agents-wont-be-easy-to-fulfill.
43. AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF THE U.S. DEPORTATION MACHINE: MORE
IMMIGRANTS ARE BEING “REMOVED” FROM THE UNITED STATES THAN EVER BEFORE 4 (2014),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_growth_of_the_
us_deportation_machine.pdf.
44. Id. ICE was responsible for slightly less than half of the 438,421 deportations in 2013, which
removed immigrants living in the interior of the United States. Julia Preston, Deportations Up in 2013;
Border Sites Were Focus, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/us/
deportation-up-in-2013-border-sites-were-focus.html.
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population. Over the last two decades, the number of unauthorized
immigrants expanded rapidly. In 1990, an estimated 3.5 million
unauthorized immigrants lived in the United States.45 By 2000, that number
had jumped to 7.9 million, and by 2007 it hit a record 12.2 million before
decreasing to approximately 11.3 million in 2013, where it has remained.46
Removal is an extraordinarily expensive way to enforce immigration law.
In 2011, ICE Director Kumar Kibble stated that on average it cost $12,500 to
deport an individual unauthorized immigrant—a number that averages the
cost of deporting immigrants at the border (which is relatively cheap) with
the cost of deporting immigrants in the interior (which is far more
expensive).47 A 2010 report by the Center for American Progress examined
the budget appropriations for ICE and concluded that the total cost of
apprehension, detention, legal proceedings, and transportation of
unauthorized immigrants living in the interior of the United States amounted
to $23,480 per individual.48 Even though ICE and CBP have doubled in size
since 2003, these agencies have not been able to remove more than about
400,000 people each year—approximately 4% of the unauthorized
population.49 In short, federal agencies have been unable to decrease the
unauthorized population through removal.
During his campaign, Trump declared that he would seek to remove all
unauthorized immigrants from the United States within two years of taking
office.50 The American Action Forum—described by the New York Times as “a
conservative-leaning research group”51—estimates the costs of removing the
entire unauthorized population at $400 billion—about two-and-a-half times
times what the federal government spends each year on its veterans, and
roughly the same amount that the states and federal government together
spend on Medicaid.52 Paul Ryan has already stated that Congress will not fund

45. PASSEL ET AL., supra note 35, at 4.
46. See id. at 4–6.
47. Jana Kasperkevic, Deporting All of America’s Illegal Immigrants Would Cost a Whopping $285
Billion, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/deporting-allof-americas-illegal-immigrants-would-cost-a-whopping-285-billion-2012-1.
48. Id.
49. The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens
Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, supra note 12, at 1.
50. Tom LoBianco, Donald Trump Promises ‘Deportation Force’ to Remove 11 Million, CNN (Nov.
12, 2015, 6:42 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/11/politics/donald-trump-deportationforce-debate-immigration.
51. Preston et al., supra note 16.
52. Ben Gitis, The Personnel and Infrastructure Needed to Remove All Undocumented Immigrants in
Two Years, AM. ACTION F. (Feb. 28, 2016), https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/thepersonnel-and-infrastructure-needed-to-remove-all-undocumented-immigrants-in-two-years; see
Preston et al., supra note 16; Philip E. Wolgin, What Would it Cost to Deport 11.3 Million Unauthorized
Immigrants?, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 18, 2015, 9:03 AM), https://www.americanprogress.
org/issues/immigration/news/2015/08/18/119474/what-would-it-cost-to-deport-11-3-millionunauthorized-immigrants.
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such a deportation force,53 and most experts agree that mass deportations
would disrupt communities and harm the economy.54 In short, removal alone
cannot resolve the nation’s unauthorized immigration problem.
President Trump now appears to agree. In an interview shortly after the
election, he backed away from plans to remove all 11.3 million unauthorized
immigrants immediately, promising instead to focus on the removal of
criminals—a number he puts at two or three million people.55 He explained
that after removing these criminal aliens and securing the border, his
administration would then make a “determination” about what to do with the
rest of the unauthorized population.56 In short, despite the campaign
rhetoric, President Trump appears to support a continuation of the Obama
Administration’s removal-or-forbearance approach, albeit with an intent to
increase the pace of removals and to abandon categorical relief programs for
unauthorized immigrants.
B. THE FAILURE OF FORBEARANCE
In part due to the expense and difficulty of removal, the executive branch
has long relied on prosecutorial discretion policies to allocate its limited
resources.57 Prosecutorial discretion refers to officials’ discretionary decisions
to forbear from enforcing the laws against an individual or a group.58 In the
immigration context, prosecutorial discretion sometimes serves humanitarian
purposes. For example, immigration officials have chosen not to deport
noncitizens to countries suffering from civil war or natural disasters, or to
deport noncitizens who have close family members who are legally present
53. Bradner, supra note 17 (“We are not planning on erecting a deportation force. . . . I
think we should put people’s minds at ease . . . . That is not what we’re focused on.”).
54. Preston et al., supra note 16 (describing the reaction of former senior immigration and
border official as “skeptical, to put it mildly” of Trump’s proposal to deport all 11.3 million
unauthorized immigrants from the United States because of the “enormous” costs and “chaos”
that would result).
55. See Interview by Lesley Stahl with Donald J. Trump, supra note 19. The number of
unauthorized immigrants with a criminal record is contested, and it is not clear where President Trump
got the number of two or three million. The nonpartisan Migration Policy Institute reports that
approximately 820,000 unauthorized immigrants have been convicted of crimes. See Haeyoun Park
& Troy Griggs, Could Trump Really Deport Millions of Unauthorized Immigrants?, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/29/us/trump-unauthorized-immigrants.html (last updated Feb.
21, 2017).
56. See Interview by Lesley Stahl with Donald J. Trump, supra note 19.
57. WADHIA, supra note 21, at 14–32.
58. Id. at 1, 7; see also Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., to Reg’l Dirs. et al. 2 (Nov. 17, 2000), http://library.niwap.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/IMM-Memo-ProsDiscretion.pdf (“The ‘favorable exercise of prosecutorial
discretion’ means a discretionary decision not to assert the full scope of the [Immigration and
Naturalization Service’s] enforcement authority as permitted under the law. Such decisions will
take different forms, depending on the status of a particular matter, but include decisions such
as not issuing [a Notice to Appear] . . . not detaining an alien placed in proceedings . . . and
approving deferred action.”).
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and who would suffer financially or otherwise if the noncitizen were
deported.59 More often, prosecutorial discretion serves the practical purpose
of allocating the nation’s limited immigration enforcement resources.
Because the number of unauthorized immigrants far exceeds the available
resources to remove them, the executive has long prioritized deportation of
those who pose a danger to the United States, as well as recent arrivals whose
removal would not disrupt families and communities.60
Prosecutorial discretion takes many forms and can be exercised at various
points in the removal process. To give just a few common examples: A Border
Patrol officer can decide not to stop and question a person found near the
U.S.–Mexico border; an ICE officer can decide not to seek a warrant to enter
a home in which unauthorized immigrants reside; a Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) attorney can choose not to trigger a removal
proceeding by issuing a Notice to Appear; or a U.S. Citizen and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”) adjudicator can grant an application for deferred action.61
In 2012, the Obama Administration began using systemized, categorical
grants of deferred action as a tool with which to set immigration selection
policy.62 On June 15, 2012, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano
announced that USCIS would grant deferred action to unauthorized
immigrants who were brought to the United States as children if they met
other qualifying conditions.63 Under this program, known as Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”), immigrants could submit applications to
USCIS seeking this status, and those found eligible were granted a two-year,
renewable reprieve from removal and could apply for work authorization.64
As of August 2016—four years after the program launched in 2012—63% of
the 1.7 million unauthorized immigrants eligible for DACA applied for relief
from deportation, and 728,285 applications had been approved.65

59. WADHIA, supra note 21, at 8.
60. Id. at 8 (“Because the government has limited resources, permitting the agency and its
officers to refrain from asserting their maximum enforcement authority against particular
populations or individuals is cost-saving and arguably allows the agency to focus its work on the
‘truly’ dangerous.”).
61. See WADHIA, supra note 21, at 11 (describing the various nonenforcement decisions that
constitute prosecutorial discretion).
62. President Obama’s administration was not the first to establish categorical grants of
deferred action. For example, in November 2005, USCIS granted deferred action to foreign
students and their dependents impacted by Hurricane Katrina. Again, in 2009, DHS granted
deferred action to certain widows and widowers of U.S. citizens whose spouses had died before
completing petitions to obtain LPR visas for their spouses. See WADHIA, supra note 21, at 32, 56–57.
63. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilar et al. 1 (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorialdiscretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
64. Id. at 2–3.
65. Faye Hipsman et al., DACA at Four: Participation in the Deferred Action Program and Impacts
on Recipients, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 1–2 (Aug. 2016).
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In November 2014, President Obama announced a new deferred action
initiative for certain parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs—a group of
approximately four million people, amounting to 35% of the unauthorized
population.66 The stated goal was to bring these unauthorized immigrants
“out of the shadows,” giving them legal permission to work and allowing them
to live for a period of time without fear of removal.67 Texas and 25 other states
immediately challenged this program, known as Deferred Action for Parents
of U.S. Citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”), on the ground
that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act, federal immigration law,
and the U.S. Constitution.68 Texas prevailed before both a federal district
court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and in June
2016 the Supreme Court issued a one-sentence per curiam opinion affirming
the judgment by an equally divided Court.69 The Trump Administration
rescinded DAPA on June 15, 2017, before it ever went into effect,70 and then
rescinded DACA on September 5, 2017.71
The Obama Administration’s attempt to use prosecutorial discretion to
shape immigration policy was not always successful. Political appointees have
limited control over the line-level enforcement officials responsible for
implementing these policies in the field. For example, memos from INS
Director Doris Meissner in 2000 and ICE Director John Morton in 2011 listed
the factors to be taken into account when determining whether to exercise
prosecutorial discretion, such as duration of residence in the United States,
close family relationships with U.S. citizens and LPRs, and the absence of a
criminal record.72 In practice, however, ICE and CBP officers continued to
66. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to León
Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf. Obama’s 2014 initiative also
expanded DACA to cover more people who had arrived as children, and it extended the time period
to renewable three-year reprieves from removal. Id.
67. President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nationimmigration (stating that deferred action recipients “can come out of the shadows”).
68. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 149 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 3, cl. 5).
69. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam).
70. Memorandum from John F. Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin K.
McAleenan et al. (“DAPA”) 3 (June 15, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/DAPA%20Cancellation%20Memo.pdf.
71. Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
James W. McCament et al. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/
memorandum-rescission-daca.
72. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 58, at 1; Memorandum from John Morton,
Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All Field Office Dirs. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 1 (June 17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/
secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir.,
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All Field Office Dirs. et al., Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain
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place unauthorized immigrants who were not priorities for removal in
removal proceedings.73 Between 2002 and 2011, 85% of the noncitizens
removed from the United States had not been convicted of any crimes other
than immigration violations, despite the Meissner Memo’s instructions to
focus resources on removing felons.74 Some of these noncitizens were longterm residents of the United States with close U.S. citizen family members.75
Moreover, race and ethnicity appeared to play an outsized role in the
selection process—a clear violation of official DHS policy.76 The Obama
Administration then turned to categorical grants of deferred action in an
attempt to formalize prosecutorial discretion, thereby avoiding inconsistent
and ad hoc decisions by line-level officials on the ground,77 but the courts
stymied these efforts.
Furthermore, because prosecutorial discretion cannot provide
unauthorized immigrants with legal status, they remain at risk of being
targeted by Congress, future administrations, the states, and private actors.78
For example, Congress has mandated that the executive detain at least 34,000
Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs 1 (June 17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/
pdf/domestic-violence.pdf.
73. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE
L.J. 104, 187 (2015) (noting that there were “few observable changes” in the use of prosecutorial
discretion following issuance of the Morton memos, and that “[a]ccording to widespread accounts,
ICE continued to place immigrants who should have been among the lowest enforcement priorities in
removal proceedings, routinely ignoring individual requests for deferred action”); Nina Rabin, Victims
or Criminals? Discretion, Sorting, and Bureaucratic Culture in the U.S. Immigration System, 23 S. CAL. REV. L.
& SOC. JUST. 195, 230 (2014); Julia Preston, Deportations Under New U.S. Policy are Inconsistent, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/us/politics/president-obamas-policy-ondeportation-is-unevenly-applied.html.
74. Rabin, supra note 73, at 230.
75. Preston, supra note 73.
76. See SIMANSKI, supra note 37, at 6; Hiroshi Motomura, The President’s Dilemma: Executive
Authority, Enforcement, and the Rule of Law in Immigration Law, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 25 (2015)
(noting that although only about 78% of unauthorized immigrants were Latino from 2008
through 2012, more than 96% of those removed in 2012 were Latino).
77. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 73, at 187 (describing how the immigration bureaucracy’s
refusal to follow enforcement guidelines pushed President Obama to propose broad, categorical
grants of deferred action).
78. As the United States explained in its brief to the Supreme Court in United States v. Texas,
deferred action does not provide any defense to removal and the executive has “absolute
discretion to revoke deferred action unilaterally, without notice or process.” Brief for the
Petitioners, supra note 12, at 5. Several candidates for the Republican nomination for president
in 2016 vowed that if they were president, they would reverse course and deport deferred action
recipients on “day one.” See, e.g., Suzanne Gamboa, Dreamer Says She Fears Deportation After Exchange
with Ted Cruz, NBC NEWS (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/dreamer-saysshe-fears-deportation-after-ted-cruz-exchange-n492246 (reporting Cruz’s statements that he
would eliminate DACA and deport recipients of deferred action); Julia Preston, Family of
Immigrants, Only One a Citizen, Anxiously Awaits Supreme Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/us/family-of-immigrants-only-one-a-citizen-anxiously-awaitssupreme-court-ruling.html (reporting that both Donald Trump and Ted Cruz have stated they would
deport all 11 million unauthorized immigrants).
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immigrants each day, directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to
prioritize removal of noncitizens who commit certain types of crimes, and
instructed the executive to identify and remove criminal aliens79—all of which
constrain the executive’s enforcement discretion.
Prosecutorial discretion also cannot protect unauthorized immigrants
from hostile state laws. Many states deny driver’s licenses,80 funding and access
to public universities and colleges,81 and professional licenses82 to
unauthorized immigrants. Some make it difficult for unauthorized
immigrants to rent apartments,83 obtain birth certificates for their U.S. citizen
children,84 or register their children in schools.85 Some states seek to keep
these benefits off limits even to unauthorized immigrants who have been
granted deferred action and work authorization.86 Although the
constitutionality of some of these state laws is contested, a state has far greater
leeway to bar services and licenses to unauthorized immigrants—even those
who have been granted deferred action—than to those immigrants who have
legal status.87

79. See DHS Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-4, 129 Stat. 39 (Mar. 4, 2015);
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 12, at 4.
80. Thirty-eight states do not grant driver’s licenses to unauthorized immigrants. See
Alternative Driver’s Licenses for Unauthorized Immigrants, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Dec. 11, 2015), http://
www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/collections/2015/12/alternative-drivers-licenses-forunauthorized-immigrants.
81. In-State Tuition and Unauthorized Immigrant Students, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 19,
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/in-state-tuition-and-unauthorized-immigrants
(finding that 30 states do not offer in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrants in that state, and most
do not offer state financial assistance to unauthorized immigrants).
82. Deepti Hajela, For Some Immigrants, an Easier Path to Professional Work, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 12,
2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/mar/12/for-some-immigrants-an-easier-pathto-professional.
83. Warren Richey, No Supreme Court Review for Local Laws Against Harboring Illegal Immigrants,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2014/
0303/No-Supreme-Court-review-for-local-laws-against-harboring-illegal-immigrants.
84. Manny Fernandez, Immigrants Fight Texas’ Birth Certificate Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/us/illegal-immigrant-birth-certificates.html (describing
Texas’s policy of limiting the types of ID parents can show to receive their children’s birth certificates).
85.
Rebecca Kaplan, Feds to schools: You must accept children of undocumented immigrants, CBS
NEWS, May 8, 2014, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/feds-to-schools-you-must-accept-childrenof-undocumented-immigrants (explaining that some states had adopted enrollment practices
that “chill or discourage the participation, or lead to the exclusion, of students,” including
undocumented students).
86. See generally, e.g., Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014) (staying
an Arizona state law barring DACA recipients from obtaining driver’s licenses).
87. See, e.g., David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real
Meaning of Zadvydas v Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 48–55 (comparing the constitutional rights of
citizens, LPRs, and unauthorized immigrants and concluding that they are subjected to different levels
of constitutional protection); Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 12, at 26 n.7 (asserting that a state
may distinguish among noncitizens provided that it has a “substantial, independent state justification”
for its choices aside from disagreement with federal immigration policies).
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As the recent election demonstrates, one administration’s prosecutorial
discretion policies can easily be reversed by the next. The Trump
Administration has rescinded both DAPA and DACA, putting at risk for
removal the same unauthorized immigrants that Obama’s administration had
sought to protect.88 Indeed, his administration could potentially deport
unauthorized immigrants using the identifying data that the Obama
Administration encouraged unauthorized immigrants to provide when
paying taxes or applying for immigration benefits.89 By executive order,
President Trump has expanded the categories of unauthorized immigrants
targeted for removal.90 As these changes illustrate, prosecutorial discretion is
by definition impermanent and leaves recipients vulnerable to shifts in policy.
Prosecutorial discretion also cannot protect unauthorized immigrants
from being exploited at both work and home. Although employers are
supposed to follow labor and employment laws for all their employees
regardless of immigration status,91 studies show that unauthorized immigrants
are more likely to be victims of wage theft, to be discriminated against, and to
be injured at the work place than are legally present employees.92
Unauthorized immigrants may not be aware of their legal rights, and in any
case are unlikely to assert those rights when they fear that doing so could lead
to being fired or deported.93 Employers are more likely to exploit
unauthorized employees, assuming (correctly) that this subset of the
population will be reluctant to report them.94 As Professor Linda Bosniak has

88. Amanda Frost, How Painful Can Trump Make the Lives of Immigrants?, SLATE (Nov. 16,
2016, 5:55 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/11/
trump_s_immigration_agenda_goes_to_washington.html.
89. Amanda Frost, Can the Government Deport Immigrants Using Information It Encouraged Them
to Provide?, 2 ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 97, 99 (2017).
90. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 25, 2017).
91. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984) (holding
that the National Labor Relations Act applies to unauthorized immigrants); Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1517 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
Title VII protects unauthorized immigrants from discrimination in the workplace); In re Reyes,
814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[I]t is well established that the protections of the Fair Labor
Standards Act are applicable to citizens and aliens alike and whether the alien is documented or
undocumented is irrelevant.”).
92. See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WORKPLACE VIOLATIONS, IMMIGRATION STATUS, AND GENDER:
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE 2008 UNREGULATED WORK SURVEY 1 (2011), http://www.
nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/Fact_Sheet_Workplace_Violations_Immigration_Gender.pdf
(finding that undocumented workers experience violations of wage and hour laws at higher rates than
U.S.-born workers); see also Jayesh M. Rathod, Immigrant Labor and the Occupational Safety and Health
Regime, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 479, 484 (2009) (detailing recent trends in occupational
fatalities and injuries among foreign-born workers in the United States).
93. Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for Worker
Claims Making, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 582–83 (2010) (finding that undocumented workers
are reluctant to demand better workplace protections out of fear of deportation).
94. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004) (“While documented
workers face the possibility of retaliatory discharge for an assertion of their labor and civil rights,
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observed, “the rights [unauthorized] immigrants formally enjoy as persons
and as residents are always held in the long shadow of the government’s
immigration enforcement power.”95
Unauthorized immigrants are also vulnerable outside the workplace.
They are more likely to be victims of crimes, including domestic violence, in
part because the perpetrators know they are less likely to report these
crimes.96 Their fear of deportation is often exploited by “notarios,” who
charge them high fees for worthless services that they claim will help them
gain legal status.97 Landlords fail to maintain housing conditions for their
unauthorized tenants, again because they know that these tenants are unlikely
to report them.98
Lawful immigrants and U.S. citizens can also suffer collateral harm from
the mistreatment of unauthorized immigrants. When unauthorized
immigrants receive less than minimum wage, work in unsafe conditions, or
pay above-market rents, they undermine the labor and housing market for
all.99 Helping unauthorized immigrants gain legal status under existing laws
would also protect these lawful residents from exploitation and harm.
C. THE POLITICAL COSTS OF REMOVAL-OR-FORBEARANCE
The removal-or-forbearance approach comes at significant political cost
to the executive branch. The right criticized President Obama for being soft
on immigration enforcement even as the left labeled him the “deporter-inchief.”100 Both critiques are supported by the facts: Obama’s administration

undocumented workers confront the harsher reality that, in addition to possible discharge, their
employer will likely report them to the INS and they will be subjected to deportation proceedings
or criminal prosecution.”).
95. Linda Bosniak, The Undocumented Immigrant: Contending Policy Approaches, in DEBATING
IMMIGRATION 85, 87 (Carol M. Swain ed., 2007).
96. See Jacob Bucher et al., Undocumented Victims: An Examination of Crimes Against Undocumented
Male Migrant Workers, 7 SW. J. CRIM. JUST. 159, 159 (2010) (finding that undocumented workers
experience a high rate of victimization, yet are unlikely to report the crimes); Mary Ann Dutton et al.,
Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resource and Service Needs of Battered Immigrant Latinas: Legal and
Policy Implications, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 245, 293 (2000).
97. About Notario Fraud, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/
immigration/projects_initiatives/fightnotariofraud/about_notario_fraud.html (last visited Oct.
1, 2017).
98. Annie Sciacca, Facing Threats from Landlords, Immigrants Push for Tenant Protections,
MERCURY NEWS (May 23, 2017, 11:53 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/05/23/facingthreats-from-landlords-immigrants-push-for-tenant-protections.
99. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984) (observing that
exploitation of unauthorized immigrants in the workplace will degrade the wages and working
conditions of U.S. citizens); Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor
Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 345 (2001) (same).
100. Nora Caplan-Bricker, Obama Will Review Deportations. Here’s What He Can Do to Stop Them,
NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 17, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117052/obamas-executiveauthority-immigration-how-far-can-he-expand-daca (observing that Obama’s rate of deportation
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was responsible for a record number of deportations and for the highest
number of unauthorized immigrants in the nation’s history.101 Moreover, with
the important exception of DACA recipients, most of the beneficiaries of
Obama’s prosecutorial discretion policies would never know that they were
low priorities for removal, and thus neither they nor their families had reason
to credit the Obama Administration for allowing them to remain in the
United States. In short, the removal-and-forbearance policy weakened
Obama’s credibility and influence over immigration policy with both the left
and the right, undermining his efforts to persuade Congress to enact
comprehensive immigration reform.
III.

COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

In light of the shortcomings of the removal-or-forbearance model, and
the low probability that Congress will address immigration enforcement in a
comprehensive way in the near future, the immigration bureaucracy should
consider alternative enforcement strategies. Cooperative enforcement
techniques could reduce the size of the unauthorized population in ways that
are both cost-efficient and better protect the humanitarian, economic, and
national security concerns that underlie prosecutorial discretion policies. In
addition, because cooperative enforcement relies on existing laws to
regularize the status of unauthorized immigrants, such a policy would avoid
the controversy and legal challenges surrounding President Obama’s
deferred action initiatives. Cooperative enforcement cannot solve the nation’s
undocumented immigration problem. Nor would it appeal to those who hope
to encourage unauthorized immigrants to self-deport through attritionthrough-enforcement policies. But for an administration that seeks to target
certain categories of unauthorized immigrants for removal while exercising
prosecutorial discretion for the rest—as both the Bush and Obama
Administrations did, and as the Trump Administration appears to be doing
thus far—cooperative enforcement provides another alternative method of
reducing the unauthorized population.
Under a cooperative enforcement approach, government officials
enforce the law by assisting regulated entities to come into compliance rather
than by initiating adversarial proceedings to sanction lawbreakers. The
approach has been heralded by administrative law scholars and embraced by
federal and state agencies in a variety of regulatory fields, but it has yet to be
applied to immigration enforcement.102 Part III.A briefly surveys the academic
literature describing this approach, and then provides several examples of
is “far ahead of where George W. Bush was at this point in his presidency, . . . earning him the
unsavory nickname of ‘deporter-in-chief’”).
101. Serena Marshall, Obama Has Deported More People than Any Other President, ABC NEWS
(Aug. 29, 2016, 2:05 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obamas-deportation-policy-numbers/
story?id=41715661.
102. See infra Part III.A–B.
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federal agencies that have used cooperative enforcement techniques to
promote compliance with federal law. Part III.B then describes how similar
cooperative enforcement techniques could be used to facilitate the
enforcement of immigration law.
A. FROM COERCION TO COOPERATION
Over the last 25 years, administrative law has shifted from top-down,
coercive, command-and-control regulation to an approach that favors
cooperation among federal officials, regulated entities, and stakeholders.103
Under a coercive enforcement approach, agencies closely monitor regulated
entities and impose fines, criminal penalties, administrative orders, and
injunctions to penalize lawbreakers and deter noncompliance. In the 1980s
and 1990s, administrative law scholars began to critique these methods as
unnecessarily adversarial, costly, and inefficient.104 In a movement that is
known by a variety of labels—including “cooperative enforcement,”
“democratic experimentalism,” “collaborative governance,” and “new
governance”—scholars argued that “rigid forms of regulation are ill suited to
accomplish their designated tasks.”105 In their place, they promoted a more
flexible, responsive regulatory regime in which agencies worked cooperatively
with regulated entities.106 These scholars praised agencies such as the EPA and
OSHA for experimenting with this new approach to regulation, and urged
more agencies to abandon top-down, command-and-control regulation in
favor of consensus-based approaches.107

103. See, e.g., Glicksman & Earnhart, supra note 4, at 623 (“Scholars and environmental
policymakers have conducted a spirited debate about the comparative merits of the coercive and
cooperative approaches to enforcement of the nation’s environmental laws.”); Michael, supra note 4,
at 537 (“[P]olicy makers throughout the federal government are increasingly insistent that regulations
be more efficient, less intrusive, and less costly.”). See generally Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in
Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633 (2012) (analyzing 25 years of scholarship critiquing commandand-control type regulation and promoting forms of cooperative regulation).
104. See, e.g., Short, supra note 103, at 636 (analyzing approximately 1,400 law review articles
on command-and-control regulation published between 1980 and 2005, and finding that
scholars were concerned about the “coercive” nature of such government regulation, as well as
its cost and inefficiency).
105. William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and
Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 152–54 (2007) (describing scholarship falling under
the label of “democratic experimentalism”); see also Freeman, supra note 4, at 15–16 (criticizing
EPA officials for their “adversarial” approach, illustrated by their rejection of a permit without
providing information about how the permit could be amended to satisfy federal standards).
106. See, e.g., Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 4, at 715; Freeman, supra note 4, at 33–65
(describing new methods of regulation in which agencies shift away from adversarial enforcement
and toward cooperation with regulated entities). See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel,
A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). See generally
Karkkainen, supra note 4.
107. On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and
Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2130 (2008) (“New governance theory views adversarial
commands as potentially counterproductive.”).
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For example, in a 1997 article promoting collaborative governance,
Professor Jody Freeman noted that the EPA is “neither adequately funded nor
sufficiently staffed to meet its enforcement responsibilities,” and, as a result,
enforcement through fines and penalties is both inconsistent and
ineffective.108 She urged the EPA to switch tactics and work collaboratively
with stakeholders—encouraging practices such as joint problem solving,
broad participation in the process, the use of provisional solutions, and the
division of regulatory responsibility between the public and private spheres—
methods that she concluded are more likely to accomplish the agency’s
ultimate goal of protecting the environment.109
Professor Orly Lobel has chronicled the collaborative governance
movement in a series of articles. As she explains, “[i]n a cooperative regime,
the role of government changes from regulator and controller to facilitator,
and law becomes a shared problem-solving process rather than an ordering
activity.”110 In place of “substantive prohibitions and adversarial enforcement,
new governance approaches attempt to actively involve firms in the legal
process, including the processes of interpreting and complying with legal
norms.”111 Likewise, Professor Freeman praised cooperative enforcement
techniques for shifting agency regulators away from their role as rigid and
heavy-handed disciplinarians and encouraging them to be “flexible” and
“engaged” in helping regulated entities come into compliance with federal
law.112
Agency officials have applied the collaborative approach to all stages of
the regulatory process—from the promulgation of new regulations and
creation of new guidance memos to their implementation and enforcement.
Agency officials are now encouraged to work together with regulated entities
and stakeholders throughout the process, crafting solutions to regulatory
problems through cooperative consultation, such as through negotiated
rulemakings in which agency officials, regulated entities, and stakeholders
work together to craft new rules. Regarding enforcement in particular,
agencies employing this approach collaborate with regulated entities to bring
them into compliance through outreach and education about the relevant
legal standards, assistance in complying with them, and by interpreting
standards flexibly and exercising discretion liberally.113
That is not to say that cooperative enforcement has, or should, replace
all forms of coercive enforcement. Today, the mainstream view is that the two
enforcement regimes should work together: First, collaboration encourages

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Freeman, supra note 4, at 17.
See generally id.
Lobel, supra note 4, at 377.
Amir & Lobel, supra note 107, at 2128.
See Freeman, supra note 4, at 31–33.
See infra Part III.A.1–4 (giving examples of cooperative enforcement).

A1_FROST.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

11/7/2017 2:28 PM

COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT IN IMMIGRATION LAW

23

and assists regulated entities to come into compliance, and the imposition of
fines and other penalties follow if entities do not comply.114
Below are brief descriptions of four such cooperative enforcement
techniques from four different federal agencies. These examples are chosen
not because they could be applied identically to the immigration context, but
rather because they illustrate a mindset and a practical approach that could
prove beneficial in immigration enforcement. Each technique demonstrates
at least one of the key components of collaborative governance: (1) Agency
officials approach regulated entities with a collaborative, rather than
adversarial, mindset; (2) they engage in outreach and education about legal
standards; (3) they seek to assist regulated entities comply with the law, rather
than punish them for past transgressions; and (4) they employ flexible
interpretations of statutes and regulations to promote overall compliance
rather than to maximize opportunities for penalties and sanctions.
1. The EPA’s Protection of Endangered Species
The EPA led the charge to replace command-and-control with a
collaborative governance approach to regulation. Traditional environmental
regulation consisted of a “staggering number” of laws that regulated entities
were required to follow, and imposed fines and other penalties for the
violation of those laws.115 In contrast, the collaborative governance approach
embraced by the government, industry, and environmental rights groups in
the 1980s and 1990s “aims to be participatory, collaborative, decentralized,
and focused on problem solving.”116 The government’s role in this new
regulatory framework is to assist and provide incentives for voluntary
compliance through new, flexible applications of existing laws and
regulations.
One prominent example is the shift in approach to endangered species
and habitat conservation. Under the previous adversarial, command-andcontrol approach, the EPA administered a statute prohibiting any person or
entity from “taking” a species designated as endangered by the U.S. Fish and

114. See, e.g., David A. Dana, The New “Contractarian” Paradigm in Environmental Regulation,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 47 (describing how the “default regime of command-and-control
regulation” provides an incentive for parties to engage in collaborative compliance); Shapiro
& Rabinowitz, supra note 4, at 715 (concluding that “a mix of cooperation and punishment can
maximize employer compliance with agency regulations”); Short, supra note 103, at 682
(“[V]oluntary and cooperative approaches . . . work best when embedded within a more coercive,
deterrence-based enforcement scheme.”); Sidney A. Shapiro, Book Review, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
229, 232 (2002) (“To maximize the influence of non-enforcement incentives to comply with
regulations, reformers suggest that cooperation should be paired with punishment, structured in
a pyramid-like fashion, with initial or minor violations treated leniently, while repeated or
significant violations are punished with increasingly severe sanctions.”).
115. See Lobel, supra note 4, at 425.
116. Id.

A1_FROST.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

24

11/7/2017 2:28 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:1

Wildlife Service.117 The agency had interpreted the term “taking” very broadly
to include incidental and unintentional harm.118 Recognizing that this rigid,
coercive approach had been unsuccessful, stakeholders came together and
developed consensus agreements that allowed some “taking” of endangered
species in return for long-term efforts to create and protect their
environment.119 Eventually, Congress responded by enacting new laws that
relaxed existing rules and encouraged flexible, consensus-based planning.
Under the new law, the taking of endangered species is allowed “if such taking
is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful
activity,” but only if the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service first approves a Habitat
Conservation Plan.120 Although participation was low at first, the government
engaged in education and outreach about this flexible compliance option,
and gradually the program picked up speed and is now widespread.121 In the
words of one new governance scholar, the Habitat Conservation Plan process
“allow[s] landowners to escape the rigidities of a notoriously inflexible
command-style rule,” replacing it with a flexible and collaborative means of
compliance with federal standards.122
2. The SEC’s “No-Action” Letters
The SEC has a long history of encouraging the use of informal processes
to help guide the general public’s understanding of securities laws.123 In
addition to providing guidance through telephone conversations and in
comments on filings, the SEC has established a process by which “[a]n
individual or entity who is not certain whether a particular product, service,
or action would constitute a violation of the federal securities law may request”
guidance from agency staff in the form of a “no-action” letter.124 Such noaction letters inform the inquirer whether the agency would seek to prevent

117. Id. at 427.
118. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) (adopting the agency’s broad
interpretation of the term “taking” to include unintentional and incidental killing of endangered
species).
119. Lobel, supra note 4, at 428.
120. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2012); see Albert C. Lin, Participants’ Experiences with Habitat
Conservation Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369, 376–77 (1996)
(discussing Habitat Conservation Plan requirements).
121. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward Ecologically Sustainable Democracy?, in DEEPENING
DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 208,
208–09 (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003).
122. Id. at 208.
123. Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 BUS. LAW. 1019, 1020–21 (1987)
(“The Commission early on recognized the need for, and encouraged the development of, a
procedure whereby its expert staff could provide informal advice and assistance to members of
the public and practitioners seeking to engage in lawful and appropriate conduct.”).
124. No Action Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm
(last updated Mar. 23, 2017).
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or penalize the described transaction, and also contain interpretations of laws
and regulations that are made public.125
Although a single no-action letter is not binding precedent, and does not
preclude an enforcement action by the SEC, these letters serve as an
important means by which regulated entities can learn how to bring their
conduct into compliance with the law.126 Furthermore, if an agency
consistently takes a position in no-action letters, it may not subsequently
reverse course without a formal rulemaking.127
The SEC’s no-action letters benefit the regulated parties and the agency
alike. They assist regulated entities by providing them with the information
they need to comply with the law, but without the cost and controversy that
would accompany being the target of an enforcement action. No-action letters
also provide a more efficient and cost-effective means for the SEC to promote
compliance with securities laws than it could through enforcement actions
alone. The SEC knows that it lacks the resources to pursue each and every
violation of the federal securities laws, which means that it is more likely to
achieve compliance by encouraging regulated entities to seek the agency’s
advice.128
3. The FDA’s “Notice of Detention and Hearing” for Illegal Products
The FDA, working together with CBP, is responsible for inspecting
products imported into the United States to ensure that they comply with the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) and associated regulations.129 The
FDA has the power to order that tainted or deficient products be detained at
a port of entry, returned to their country of origin, or even destroyed.130 But
the FDA does not employ these coercive enforcement efforts until after
notifying the importer of the violation and providing the importer with the
opportunity to relabel or recondition the product to bring it into
compliance.131

125. Lemke, supra note 123, at 1022.
126. If the SEC concludes that the staff erred in a no-action letter, it may nonetheless permit
a company that reasonably and in good faith relied on the no action letter to act in accordance
with that letter. See United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, SEC No-Action
Letter, 2002 WL 31749942 (Dec. 6, 2002).
127. See 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.35 (7th
ed. 2016); see also Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps. v. American Int’l Grp., 462 F.3d 121,
123 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We believe that an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation
made at the time the regulation was implemented or revised should control unless that agency
has offered sufficient reasons for its changed interpretation.”).
128. Lemke, supra note 123, at 1023 (“[B]y assisting the public in complying with the law,
[no-action letters] promote[] voluntary compliance and lessen[] the demand on the SEC’s
limited regulatory and enforcement resources.”).
129. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL § 9–1–2 (2017).
130. Id. § 9–1.
131. Id. § 9–1–5.
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As explained in the FDA’s compliance manual, if the FDA determines
that a product violates the FDCA, it will notify the importer of the problem
through a “Notice of Detention and Hearing” that “shall specify the nature of
the violation charged.”132 The importer is then given an opportunity to
demonstrate the admissibility of the product at an informal hearing that
usually occurs within ten business days of detention.133 But the importer may
instead choose to “propose a manner in which an article . . . can be brought
into compliance with the Act or be removed from coverage under the Act.”134
If the FDA authorizes relabeling or reconditioning of the product to bring it
into compliance with the FDCA, and the product then passes a second
inspection, the product will then be approved for importation into the United
States.135 In short, the FDA first seeks to assist importers to come into
compliance with the law, and does not impose sanctions or penalties for the
importation of illegal products unless the importer fails to relabel or
recondition a product to meet the legal standards.
4. OSHA’s Education and Outreach
OSHA has a broad mandate to protect workplace health and safety, but
very limited enforcement resources to inspect and sanction violators. Since
2000, OSHA has expanded programs within its Cooperative Compliance
Office—an office designed to assist and facilitate employers’ efforts to meet
federal worker safety standards—rather than simply punish noncompliance.
For example, the Safety and Health Achievement Recognition Program
(“SHARP”) exempts small employers in high risk industries from general,
scheduled OSHA inspections, and reduces the size of penalties.136 To qualify,
an employer must schedule consultations with an OSHA-funded, state-run
program that will regularly meet with the employer to evaluate workplace
health and safety.137 Similarly, OSHA has developed a Strategic Partnership
Program in which it works with employers in high-risk industries to reduce
and eliminate specific workplace hazards, and in return reduces the number
of inspections and the size of penalties.138
OSHA also engages in broad outreach programs designed to educate and
train employers seeking to improve health and safety and ensure compliance
with federal standards. The agency distributes newsletters and has created an

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 29 C.F.R. § 1908.7 (2016).
137. Id.; see also Orly Lobel, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1106 (2005) (describing SHARP).
138. OSHA Strategic Partnership Program (OSPP), OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/partnerships/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
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interactive website to assist employers to meet federal standards.139 The OSHA
Training Institute offers over 80 training courses in workplace health and
safety.140 OSHA has also created a Training Grant Program that provides
funding to nonprofits to develop training and education programs in
workplace health and safety.141 All of these initiatives prioritize education,
flexible interpretation of legal standards, and assistance with compliance over
penalties, fines, and injunctions.
***
These four examples of cooperative enforcement from four different
agencies share a few common features. All replace a rigid, rule-bound,
adversarial model of regulation with a cooperative and consensus-based
approach. All are intended to encourage greater compliance at lower cost—
both to the agency and to the regulated entities. And all use education,
outreach, consultation, flexibility, and the liberal exercise of discretion to
promote the end goal of assisting regulated entities to comply with regulatory
standards as efficiently and effectively as possible.
B. COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT IN IMMIGRATION LAW
Like the EPA of old, immigration officials at ICE and CBP consider
themselves primarily responsible for enforcing complex and arcane
immigration laws through command and control strategies.142 As described in
Part II, these agencies are focused on investigation, detention, and removal—
all adversarial processes with a coercive end-goal of forcing unauthorized
immigrants to leave the United States. These agencies track the number of
immigrants placed in removal proceedings, the number of removal orders
issued, and the number of people deported each year.143 Tellingly, however,
they do not keep count of the overall number of people who moved from
unlawful to lawful status, or credit particular immigration officials or agencies
with assisting them in that process.
Nonetheless, immigration officials at times adopt a cooperative
enforcement approach. Immigration agencies seek to educate immigrants

139. See OSHA QuickTakes Newsletter, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.
gov/as/opa/quicktakes/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2017); Occupational Safety & Health Admin.,
OSHA Hazard Identification Training Tool, DEPT. LAB., https://www.osha.gov/hazfinder (last visited Oct.
1, 2017).
140. OSHA Training Institute, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.
gov/dte/oti/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
141. See Susan Harwood Training Grant Program, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
https://www.osha.gov/dte/sharwood (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
142. See Freeman, supra note 4, at 13 & n.31 (describing how the EPA has viewed itself primarily
as an “enforcement agency” whose “institutional mission since its creation has been to enforce
compliance with environmental statutes through primarily command and control strategies”).
143. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2014 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 91–115 (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
ois_yb_2014.pdf.
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about their options for obtaining a visa to visit, work, or study in the United
States. The USCIS website includes information and forms to assist
immigrants in applying for visas and other immigration benefits, and the
agency does its best to translate convoluted statutes and regulations into plain
English.144 USCIS has also recently begun to streamline procedures and craft
new waivers and exceptions to bars to legal status, which suggests that it might
be willing to embrace a cooperative enforcement approach.145
As it stands today, however, the system provides very little information to
those who are unauthorized about how to legalize their status. Nor is there
any mechanism by which an unauthorized immigrant can seek out assistance
without risk of becoming subject to an enforcement action. To the contrary,
the immigration bureaucracy approaches the task of reviewing petitions for
adjustment of status or applications for naturalization with a “gotcha”
mentality, scouring petitions and applications to determine whether the
applicants have ever been out of status, or were granted status in error in the
past, and then denying the application or commencing removal proceedings
as a result.146 Immigration practice manuals warn that even immigrants who
believe that they are legally present in the United States run a risk when they
apply to adjust to LPR status or seek to naturalize; their applications may lead
immigration officials to search for errors that will lead to their removal—even
if the error was on the part of the immigration authorities and not the
immigrant.147 As USCIS’s policy manual explains, every naturalized citizen is
at risk of having his citizenship revoked and being removed if “any eligibility
requirement” was subsequently found not to have been met, “even if the
person is innocent of any willful deception or misrepresentation.”148 In short,
the agencies responsible for regulating immigration take an adversarial rather
than cooperative approach to enforcement.149
The immigration enforcement bureaucracy could change course. Just as
the EPA, SEC, FDA, and OSHA are now willing to assist individuals and

144.
145.
146.

Id.
See infra Part III.B.4.
See, e.g., Julia Preston, Perfectly Legal Immigrants, Until They Applied for Citizenship, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/12/us/12naturalize.html.
147. See, e.g., id. (describing how long-term, legal immigrants who apply for naturalization
can be deported for minor errors in their visa applications to enter the United States).
148. See Grounds for Revocation of Naturalization—USCIS Policy Manual—Volume 12, Part L,
Chapter 2, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/
PolicyManual-Volume12-PartL-Chapter2.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2017) (“[A]ny eligibility
requirement for naturalization that was not met can form the basis for an action to revoke the
naturalization of a person. This includes the requirements of residence, physical presence, lawful
admission for permanent residence, good moral character, and attachment to the U.S.
Constitution.”); see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 340, 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012)
(describing the grounds for revoking naturalization).
149. Cf. Freeman, supra note 4, at 13 (describing how “agency officials frequently see
themselves in only one institutional light, as part of, for example, an ‘enforcement agency’”).
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corporations come into compliance through outreach, education, assistance,
flexible interpretation of ambiguous statutory and regulatory terms, and
liberal use of discretion, immigration authorities can do the same by helping
unauthorized immigrants take advantage of existing pathways to legal status.
Indeed, studies show that a significant percentage of unauthorized
immigrants can apply for legal status and even citizenship, but are often
unaware of their options or unable to navigate the system on their own.150
Thus, it appears that immigration officials could play an important role in
helping unauthorized immigrants obtain legal status, which in turn could be
a cost-effective and efficient means of accomplishing their ultimate goal of
reducing the unauthorized population while taking into account
humanitarian, economic, and national security concerns that inevitably arise
in immigration enforcement.
This Part briefly describes some of the existing pathways to legal status,
and then explains how immigration officials could adopt a cooperative
enforcement approach to assist unauthorized immigrants to take advantage
of them.
1. Cancellation of Removal
Some unauthorized immigrants are eligible for a statutory form of relief
known as “cancellation of removal,” which provides recipients with LPR status
and puts them on a path to citizenship.151 To be eligible, an immigrant must
show continuous physical presence in the United States for ten years; that he
or she is a person of “good moral character” who has not committed certain
crimes; and that removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” to his or her U.S. citizen or LPR spouse, parent, or child.152
Cancellation is a discretionary form of relief, meaning that even if an
applicant qualifies, he or she may be denied relief if an immigration judge
concludes that the equities are not in his or her favor.153
As currently employed, few unauthorized immigrants qualify for this
form of relief. By statute, relief is capped at 4,000 people each year.154 Under
current policies, immigration judges will not adjudicate requests for
cancellation of removal until a slot under that quota is available, forcing all
those seeking such relief to wait years for a hearing on the matter before an
immigration judge.155 In addition, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

150. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
151. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. Id. § 240A(e)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1).
155. 8 C.F.R. 1240.21(c)(1) (2016) (“[F]urther decisions to grant or deny [cancellation of
removal] shall be reserved until such time as a grant becomes available under the annual
limitation in a subsequent fiscal year.”); see also Margaret H. Taylor, What Happened to Non-LPR
Cancellation? Rationalizing Immigration Enforcement by Restoring Durable Relief from Removal, 30 J.L.
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has interpreted the term “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to
mean hardship “substantially beyond that which would ordinarily be expected
to result from the alien’s deportation.”156 Finally, even those who are eligible
under the statutory standards may be denied relief in an immigration judge’s
discretion.
Furthermore, the remedy is only available to those in removal
proceedings. Accordingly, unauthorized immigrants who benefit from
prosecutorial discretion policies will never have an opportunity to legalize
their status using cancellation of removal.157 Ironically, then, the only
unauthorized immigrants who can seek this remedy are those the government
seeks to deport—a group that is, on the whole, less sympathetic and less likely
to qualify for cancellation of removal.158 Indeed, one of the problems with the
removal-or-forbearance model of immigration enforcement is that those
unauthorized immigrants whom the executive branch decides are not
enforcement priorities—typically long-term, law-abiding unauthorized
immigrants with close family members who are U.S. citizens or LPRs—will
never have access to a form of relief specifically intended to benefit them.159
& POL. 527, 544 (2015) (describing how eligible immigrants are in “legal limbo” for years as they
wait for their cancellation of removal hearings); Memorandum from Brian M. O’Leary, Chief
Immigration Judge, to All Immigration Judges et al. 2–3 (Feb. 3, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2012/02/03/12-01.pdf (explaining that the Chief Immigration
Judge will announce when 3,500 applications have been granted in the fiscal year, after which
Immigration Judges must reserve their decisions unless the applicant is statutorily ineligible and
wait for the Chief Immigration Judge to allocate the remaining 500 non-LPR cancellation grants
to ensure that the statutory cap is not breached).
156. In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 56, 59 (B.I.A. 2001). The BIA’s
interpretation is consistent with the legislative history, in which Congress explained that it
“deliberately changed the required showing of hardship from ‘extreme hardship’ to ‘exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship’ to emphasize that the alien must provide evidence of harm to
his spouse, parent, or child substantially beyond that which ordinarily would be expected to result
from the alien’s deportation.” H.R. REP. No. 104-828, at 213–14 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
157. By statute, authority to grant cancellation of removal has been delegated to the Attorney
General and not the Department of Homeland Security. See Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (“The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to the
status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or
deportable from the United States . . . .”). Under current practice, immigration judges award
cancellation of removal after receiving an application for this form of relief in a removal
proceeding. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FORM EOIR-42B,
APPLICATION FOR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL AND ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS FOR CERTAIN
NONPERMANENT RESIDENTS, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/
2015/07/24/eoir42b.pdf (last updated July 2015).
158. See Taylor, supra note 155, at 545 (“Ironically, a robust system of prosecutorial
discretion, which focuses enforcement resources on high priority cases, will often identify
individuals who qualify for non-LPR cancellation as low priority cases that should not be pursued,
thereby cutting off access to this durable form of relief because those who qualify must be in
removal proceedings to apply.”).
159. On rare occasions, immigration attorneys advise clients to ask immigration officials to
place them in removal proceedings so that they can seek cancellation of removal. See LAUREN
HARTLEY & JAMES GILBERT, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, NOTICES TO APPEAR: LEGAL CHALLENGES
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Unauthorized immigrants could more easily legalize their status through
cancellation of removal if immigration officials adopted cooperative
enforcement techniques such as education and outreach, streamlining
procedures, altering interpretation of statutory terms, and liberal use of
discretion. For example, immigration officials could allow noncitizens to
affirmatively apply for this remedy, rather than limit access only to those
noncitizens who are already in removal proceedings. Such a change in policy
is not unprecedented. In the late 1990s, the Department of Justice
promulgated rules allowing nationals of El Salvador, Guatemala, the former
Soviet Union, and certain Eastern European countries to affirmatively apply
for such relief through USCIS, without regard to whether they were in
removal proceedings.160 This rule change could be expanded to allow all
eligible unauthorized immigrants to apply for cancellation of removal
through affirmative applications to USCIS, making this remedy available to
many more unauthorized immigrants than can currently take advantage of
it—including those long-term, law-abiding unauthorized immigrants who are
most likely to qualify for the remedy.161 Once such a change in procedure
occurs, the agency could then advertise the availability of cancellation of
removal and encourage eligible unauthorized immigrants to apply for it.
In addition, as Professor Margaret Taylor has suggested, immigration
officials could choose to adjudicate cancellation of removal applications
immediately, even if the 4,000-person cap has been reached.162 Those
applicants found to be eligible could be granted conditional approval that is
suspended until they reach their spot in the queue. These conditionallyapproved applicants could then be granted deferred action and allowed to
remain in the United States until the date at which approval is formally
granted.163 Allowing for the immediate adjudication of applications for
cancellation of removal provides more security and certainty for successful
applicants, who will wait their turn in the queue knowing that they will
eventually obtain legal status. Immediate adjudication also has the collateral
benefit of enabling rapid deportation of those in removal proceedings who
are not eligible. The result would be both more efficient and more humane,

STRATEGIES 17–18 (June 2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/
files/practice_advisory/notices_to_appear_fin_6-30-14.pdf.
160. Taylor, supra note 155, at 538 (describing the change in policy); see also Applications
for Suspension of Deportation or Special Rule Cancellation of Removal Under Section 203 of
Pub. L. 105-100, 8 C.F.R. 1240.60 to .70 (2016).
161. Section 1103(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that “[t]he
Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of
this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens.”
Immigration and Nationality Act § 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).
162. Taylor, supra note 155, at 535–47.
163. See id. at 538 (discussing suspension and cancellation of deportation procedures).

AND
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and would reduce the overall number of unauthorized immigrants in the
United States.164
In addition to altering procedures to make the remedy of cancellation of
removal more readily available, immigration officials could exercise their
discretion more liberally. They could adopt a broader interpretation of
“extreme and unusual hardship” so that more applicants are eligible for the
remedy. They could also choose to grant relief to all who are eligible under
the statutory standard, instead of denying it to those whom they find
undeserving.
These proposed changes resemble the collaborative governance
initiatives adopted by other federal agencies described in Part III.A. For
example, the EPA adopted a narrower interpretation of the term “taking”
under the Endangered Species Act provided that the landowners developed
a comprehensive plan to protect endangered species, which allowed
landowners to obtain permits that once would have been denied to them
under an adversarial style of enforcement.165 The SEC adopted the no-action
letter to quickly provide information to those who wanted to determine
whether their conduct would subject them to an enforcement action.166
OSHA changed its methods of inspections and sanctions to accommodate
employers who took steps to comply with the overall goals of worker health
and safety.167 Immigration officials, like officials in these other federal
agencies, have the same ability to enforce through streamlined procedures
and flexible application of the law—providing finality for all who apply, and
legal status for some.
2. U Visas for Victims of Crimes
U visas are available to victims of certain serious crimes who have suffered
physical or mental abuse and are willing to assist law enforcement in
investigating or prosecuting the crime.168 To be eligible for the visa, a law
enforcement official must certify that the victim was or will likely be of

164. Immediately adjudicating applications would also reduce the number of noncitizens
who apply for this remedy despite having non-meritorious cases. See id. at 543 (stating that
“immigration judges have voiced frustration that, in their view, too many respondents apply for
non-LPR cancellation when the claimed hardship to qualifying relatives does not meet the
stringent ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ standard”). Today, the long delay
between application for cancellation of removal and a hearing date, coupled with the high
likelihood that the noncitizen can obtain work authorization during that period, “creates a
powerful incentive for non-LPRs in removal proceedings to file unsubstantiated cancellation
claims.” Id.
165. See supra Part III.A.1.
166. See supra Part III.A.2.
167. See supra Part III.A.3.
168. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012).
To be successful, a U visa applicant also must be admissible to the United States, or eligible for a
waiver of any ground of inadmissibility. See id.; see also id. § 214(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b).
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assistance.169 The number of U visas is capped at 10,000 each year.170
Although the cap is frequently reached before the end of the fiscal year,
USCIS continues to review pending petitions for eligibility, and those who are
eligible receive deferred action from removal and work authorization while
they wait their turn in the queue.171 Those who successfully obtain U visas may
apply to adjust to LPR status after three years,172 and if successful may apply
to naturalize five years after obtaining LPR status.
Many more unauthorized immigrants are eligible for this visa than apply
for it.173 Some who are eligible likely do not know about the remedy, or do
not know how to apply for it. The need to obtain “certification” from a law
enforcement agency is particularly daunting for unauthorized immigrants,
many of whom view law enforcement with suspicion.174 Many law enforcement
officials are unaware of the U visa for crime victims, and the role they must
play to help immigrants qualify for it, and thus may refuse to certify that the
immigrant has provided them with assistance.175 Finally, as with other such
forms of relief, unauthorized immigrants might hesitate to apply for the visa,
reluctant to draw attention to themselves for fear that if they fail to qualify
they will then become targets for removal.176
Cooperative enforcement techniques could assist unauthorized
immigrants to obtain U visas. Immigration officials could proactively educate
169. See id. § 214(p)(1), § 1184(p)(1).
170. Id. § 214(p)(2), § 1184(p)(2).
171. NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., PRO BONO ATTORNEY MANUAL ON IMMIGRATION RELIEF
FOR CRIME VICTIMS: U VISAS 27 (2017), https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/
files/uploaded-files/no-content-type/2017-03/U-visa-Manual-2017-03.pdf.
172. See Victims of Criminal Act Activity: U Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVICES, (Aug. 17, 2017, 3:09 PM), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-traffickingother-crimes/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrantstatus.
173. Sarah Childress, For Shadow Victims of Violence, the “U Visa” Can Help, FRONTLINE (June
24, 2013, 7:17 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/social-issues/rape-in-thefields/for-shadow-victims-of-violence-the-u-visa-can-help (“[I]mmigration attorneys say that there
are many . . . victims of abuse who don’t come forward, or are arrested anyway and deported,
because of the Secure Communities program . . . . These attorneys say that the program works at
cross-purposes to the U visa, driving victims of domestic violence and other crimes back
underground.”).
174. Gustavo Solis, Undocumented Immigrants Who Are Crime Victims Can Apply for U Visas. But
Police Don’t Always Cooperate., USA TODAY (Feb. 8, 2017, 8:05 AM), https://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/2017/02/08/new-data-shows-how-california-law-helps-undocumented-immigrantsobtain-legal-status/97454834.
175. See, e.g., Leslye E. Orloff et al., Mandatory U-Visa Certification Unnecessarily Undermines the
Purpose of the Violence Against Women Act’s Immigration Protections and Its “Any Credible Evidence”
Rules—A Call for Consistency, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 619, 637–38 (2010).
176. See, e.g., IMMIGRANT LAW CTR. OF MINN., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR U VISA
APPLICANTS 1–2 (2016), https://www.ilcm.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/U-visa-clientFAQ-English.pdf (explaining that “immigration [officials] could decide to forward your [U visa
application] information to another branch of the Department of Homeland Security, including
[Immigration and Customs Enforcement],” and adding that “we have not yet seen this happen”).
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unauthorized immigrants about the availability of this remedy and then assist
them in applying for it, just as OSHA provides trainings and education to
employers about how to satisfy federal legal standards.177 Likewise,
immigration officials could educate state and local law enforcement officers
about their role in the process, and provide a liaison to answer their questions.
Immigration officials can exercise their discretion liberally by granting U visas
to all who qualify under the statutory standard, just as the EPA, OSHA, and
SEC officials make an effort to approve the activities of those who work with
them to try to meet statutory standards.178 Finally, immigration officials could
agree not to target for removal unauthorized immigrants who came to their
attention solely because they applied for this benefit, just as OSHA officials
do not impose full penalties on employers who have worked in good faith to
try to meet their standards.179
3. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
A federal statute permits unauthorized immigrants who are under 21
years of age to apply for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (“SIJS”), which
allows them to adjust to LPR status and, eventually, to apply for citizenship.180
To be eligible, juveniles must first obtain a ruling by a state court that:
(1) they are “dependent on a juvenile court” or “legally committed to, or
placed under the custody of,” a state agency or department “or an individual
or entity appointed by a [s]tate or juvenile court”; (2) “reunification with
[one] or both . . . parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, [or]
abandonment” (or a similar state-law standard); and (3) it is not in their best
interest to return to their “country of nationality or country of last habitual
residence.”181 Armed with this predicate order, the juvenile can then apply to
USCIS for SIJS. USCIS officials have the discretion to refuse to grant an
application if they believe that the juvenile sought the court order primarily
to obtain a legal immigration status, rather than for protection from an
abusive or neglectful parent.182
SIJS applications are capped at 10,000 per year, though that number had
never been reached before 2016.183 Minors are often unaware that they are
eligible for SIJS status and, in any case, lack the knowledge and resources to
177. See supra notes 139–41 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
180. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012); id.
§ 203(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4).
181. Id. § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J).
182. See Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir., & Pearl Chang, Acting Chief,
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., to Field Leadership 3 (Mar. 24, 2009), https://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/TVPRA_SIJ.pdf.
183. Kimberly Krone, US Immigration Caps Put Abused Children at Risk, THE HILL (Jan. 12,
2016, 7:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/265510-us-immigrationcaps-put-abused-children-at-risk.
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argue their case before a state court and then a federal agency.184 State courts
are inconsistent in their approach to SIJS applications, and USCIS officials
have at times second-guessed state court determinations that a child has been
abused, abandoned, or neglected by one or both parents.185
As with any of the remedies described here, applying for SIJS is risky. A
practice guide for SIJS applicants warns: “Children who are not in removal
proceedings must carefully consider the potential risks and benefits of filing
a SIJS petition [because the] application will bring the child to the attention
of USCIS, which may lead to the initiation of removal proceedings against the
child should the petition be denied.”186
Using a cooperative enforcement approach, USCIS officials could
engage in outreach to immigrant communities to inform them of the
availability of SIJS, and could focus on educating school guidance counselors
and teachers about this option. USCIS could also do more to educate state
court judges about their role in the process to avoid inconsistent rulings and
confusion over interpretation of the statutory terms governing SIJS predicate
orders. In addition, USCIS adjudicators could choose to accept any state court
finding of abuse, abandonment, and neglect as a rebuttable presumption that
the juvenile is eligible for SIJS, thereby avoiding a second inquiry into the
legitimacy of the state court order. (Such an approach would also be more
respectful of state courts, who currently make final decisions that USCIS
officials can disregard.) Finally, USCIS could adopt a policy of not pursuing
failed SIJS applicants for removal absent extraordinary circumstances, thereby
reducing the risks of applying for SIJS and encouraging more potentially
eligible juveniles to do so. All of these techniques—education and outreach,
flexibility in interpreting and applying federal standards, cooperation with
state actors, and encouraging voluntary compliance—are consistent with the

184. Maura M. Ooi, Note, Unaccompanied Should Not Mean Unprotected: The Inadequacies of Relief
for Unaccompanied Immigrant Minors, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 883, 896 (2011). Children at Risk, a
nonpartisan research and advocacy organization dedicated to improving the quality of life for
children in Texas, has urged increased training for school counselors, teachers, and CBP to ensure
that children eligible for SIJS are identified and provided the information they need to apply for
this status. See CHILDREN AT RISK, CHILDREN ON THE BORDER: THE USE AND LIMITATIONS OF SPECIAL
IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS 32 (2015), http://173.45.238.175/content/wp-content/uploads/
2015/08/Children-On-The-Border.pdf.
185. See Wendi J. Adelson, The Case of the Eroding Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, 18 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 65, 80 (2008). However, a memo to USCIS adjudicators instructed them
to “not second-guess the [juvenile] court’s rulings or question whether the court’s order was
properly issued.” Id. at 68 (alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum from William R. Yates,
Associate Dir. For Operations, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., to Regional Dirs. & District
Dirs. (May 27, 2004), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/
Static_Files_Memoranda/Archives%201998-2008/2004/sij_memo_052704.pdf).
186. KIDS IN NEED OF DEFENSE, CHAPTER 4: SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) 8,
https://supportkind.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Chapter-4-Special-Immigrant-JuvenileStatus-SIJS.pdf.
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cooperative enforcement techniques used by other federal agencies, as
described in Part III.A.
4. Waivers and Exceptions for Unlawful Presence
One path to legal permanent residence in the United States is for a close
family member to petition for a visa on the noncitizen’s behalf. However, this
option is unavailable to unauthorized immigrants who entered the United
States without inspection, who must leave the United States and apply for a
visa at a consular office abroad.187 If these immigrants have remained in the
United States without lawful status for more than 180 days, they are barred
from returning to the United States for three years after leaving the
country.188 If they have accrued more than a year of unlawful presence, they
are barred from returning for ten years.189
Unauthorized immigrants in this situation are eligible for a waiver to the
three/ten-year bars if: (1) they are the spouse or child of a U.S. citizen or LPR;
and (2) can demonstrate that their absence from the United States will cause
“extreme hardship” to that relative.190 Few unauthorized immigrants have
been willing to leave the United States to apply for this waiver, however,
because they fear being denied the waiver and thus barred from returning.191
Moreover, even those who are granted the waiver can be separated from their
families for many months—sometimes even over a year—while USCIS
considers their application.192 Thus, many unauthorized immigrants who
could both adjust status and qualify for the waiver allowing them to return
quickly to the United States never even try to do so.

187. Immigration and Nationality Act § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2012).
188. Id. § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I).
189. Id. § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). Congress enacted the
three/ten-year bars to discourage immigrants from remaining in the United States without status.
Ironically, however, these bars may have contributed to the spike in the unauthorized population
because many immigrants who might have once adjusted status are now unable to do so. See
MASSEY ET AL., supra note 46, at 128–33.
190. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v). In
addition to these requirements, the noncitizen must also be “admissible” aside from the unlawful
presence bar, which bars noncitizens convicted of certain crimes and immigration violations from
obtaining such waivers. See Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers, supra note 8.
191. In its rulemaking to establish a new streamlined process for applying for the waiver, the
Department of Homeland Security explained that “[e]xisting demand [for waivers] is
constrained by the current process that requires individuals to leave the United States and be
separated for unpredictable and sometimes lengthy amounts of time from their immediate
relatives in the United States in order to obtain an immigrant visa to become an LPR.” Provisional
Unlawful Presence Waivers of Inadmissibility for Certain Immediate Relatives, 78 Fed. Reg. 535,
566 (Jan. 3, 2013) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 212).
192. In its rulemaking, DHS explained: “As a result of the often lengthy processing times and
uncertainty about whether they qualify for a waiver of the unlawful presence inadmissibility
grounds, many immediate relatives who may qualify for an immigrant visa are reluctant to
proceed abroad to seek an immigrant visa.” Id. at 536.
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In 2013, DHS responded to this problem by promulgating a new
regulation creating a provisional unlawful presence waiver, known as the
601A waiver.193 Those who may be eligible for the waiver can now apply before
leaving the United States.194 If the waiver is granted, they can then leave to
apply for adjustment of status abroad knowing that they will be permitted to
return in the near future.195
The 601A waiver is itself a good example of cooperative enforcement. By
allowing immigrants to apply for the waiver without leaving the country, DHS
made the waiver accessible to more of those unauthorized immigrants who
were eligible for it, reducing both the risk of going abroad and the amount of
time these unauthorized immigrants would have to be separated from their
families, jobs, and lives in the United States.196 Furthermore, the new process
also benefitted USCIS by “reduc[ing] the degree of interchange between the
U.S. Department of State and USCIS” and by “creat[ing] greater efficiencies
for both the U.S. Government and most provisional unlawful presence waiver
applicants.”197
USCIS could do even more to make this waiver available for eligible
unauthorized immigrants using cooperative enforcement techniques. The
agency could engage in education and outreach to inform unauthorized
immigrants who are unaware of the waiver of its existence, and then assist
them in the application process. The agency could adopt a more flexible and
expansive definition of the “extreme hardship” standard required for
eligibility—a vague term that is open to broader interpretation than the
agency currently gives it. And USCIS could grant all the waivers of those who
qualify, rather than exercising its discretion to deny some eligible noncitizens
from obtaining these waivers.198
***
Cooperative enforcement’s potential was illustrated by a recent survey of
67 legal service providers assisting applicants for DACA. The survey found that
14.3% of the applicants for DACA were also eligible to legalize their status
through one of the pathways to permanent legal status described above, which
they learned only after they were encouraged to come out of the shadows and
apply for deferred action.199 Over 25% of those eligible for legal status could
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. (“The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) anticipates that these changes will
significantly reduce the length of time U.S. citizens are separated from their immediate relatives
who engage in consular processing abroad.”).
197. Id.
198. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) (per
curiam) (holding that the term “extreme hardship” is “not self-explanatory, and reasonable men
could easily differ as to [its] construction,” and further concluding that the federal agency in
charge of implementing the statute should determine its meaning).
199. Wong et al., supra note 9, at 289.
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do so through a family-based petition.200 Another 23.9% could apply for a U
visa as crime victims who had assisted law enforcement officers in pursuing
the perpetrators of that crime.201 Adjustment to SIJS was an option for 12.6%
because they had been abused, abandoned, or neglected by one or both
parents, and could show that return to their home country was not in their
best interest.202
Although these DACA applicants had lived in the United States for many
years, they had either not known about these options for obtaining legal
status, or had been unable to navigate the application process on their own.
As explained above, most of these routes to legal status are obscure and
involve a complex application process, so it is not surprising that the
unauthorized immigrants who came forward to apply for DACA—a wellpublicized program—had not figured out on their own that they were eligible
for a better, more durable legal status that could put them on the pathway to
citizenship.203
The executive’s broad reliance on prosecutorial discretion has, ironically,
exacerbated the problem. Immigrants who benefit from prosecutorial
discretion are the ones most likely to qualify for discretionary forms of relief
such as cancellation of removal, U visas, SIJS, and exceptions to the bars to
adjustment of status. But most of these unauthorized immigrants will never
learn about, or have an opportunity to apply for, certain types of relief.204
Thus, the current strategy of removal-or-forbearance impedes unauthorized
immigrants from accessing pathways to legal status—a result that undermines
immigration officials’ enforcement goals. Federal immigration officials could
reverse this trend by adopting cooperative enforcement techniques to help
unauthorized immigrants shift from illegal to legal status.
IV.

ASSESSING A COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

Assuming cooperative enforcement in the immigration context is
feasible, is it desirable? This Part examines the arguments on either side of
that question to assess whether the cooperative enforcement techniques used
by other federal agencies have a role in immigration enforcement.

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. A survey of unauthorized immigrants who were potentially eligible for DACA but did not
apply found that many could not afford the $465 fee (43%), did know how to apply (10%), or feared
sending personal information to the government (15%). ROBERTO G. GONZALES & ANGIE M. BAUTISTACHAVEZ, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, TWO YEARS AND COUNTING: ASSESSING THE GROWING POWER OF
DACA (2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/two_
years_and_counting_assessing_the_growing_power_of_daca_final.pdf.
204. See Taylor, supra note 155, at 544.
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A. OBJECTIONS TO COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT IN IMMIGRATION LAW
Enforcement techniques should be measured not simply by their shortterm effectiveness, but also by their expressive value and the incentives they
create.205 Critics of cooperative enforcement in immigration might argue that
this approach sends the wrong message to unauthorized immigrants about
the gravity of their legal transgressions and the nation’s willingness to accept
them as full members of society, which in turn might increase the flow of
unauthorized immigrants into the United States. They might further argue
that because immigration law is closer to criminal than administrative law, the
enforcement techniques used by other federal agencies are inappropriate in
the immigration context.
1. Rewarding Lawbreakers
Critics might argue that cooperative enforcement techniques reward
lawbreakers by granting legal status and eventually citizenship to those who
flouted immigration laws by entering or remaining in the United States
without permission.206 This critique sweeps too broadly, however. Some of the
unauthorized immigrants who could benefit from cooperative enforcement
were brought or sent to the United States as children, and thus cannot be
blamed for being in the United States without permission. For others, the lifethreatening violence and poverty in their home countries offsets their
culpability. Deportation of unauthorized immigrants can also harm third
parties, such as U.S. citizen children, who have done nothing to deserve the
loss of a parent. Accordingly, the argument that cooperative enforcement
rewards lawbreakers is not grounds for objecting to this enforcement method

205. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for
Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 374 (1999) (discussing the broader
expressive value of various types of criminal sanctions); Dan Markel, Wrong Turns on the Road to
Alternative Sanctions: Reflections on the Future of Shaming Punishments and Restorative Justice, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 1385, 1388–91 (2007) (same).
206. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule of Law,
2007 National Lawyers Convention of the Federalist Society, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1323, 1329–31 (2008)
(arguing that legislative amnesty would incentivize illegal immigration); Elizabeth Llorente, Sen.
Ted Cruz Moves Front and Center in GOP Response to Border Crisis, FOX NEWS (July 21, 2014), http://
www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/07/21/sen-ted-cruz-moves-front-and-center-in-gop-responseto-border-crisis.html (describing how Republicans in Congress opposed President Obama’s
deferred action initiatives because they were a “reward to lawbreakers”); Jessica Vaughan, Senate
Bill Rewards & Protects Lawbreakers, Undermines Law Enforcement, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (May 2,
2013), http://cis.org/vaughan/senate-bill-rewards-protects-lawbreakers-undermines-law-enforcement
(criticizing proposed legislation that would have legalized most of the unauthorized population
as “designed to reward and protect lawbreakers”); see also Darryl Fears, Discord on the Immigration
Accord, WASH. POST (May 21, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2007/05/20/AR2007052001281.html (same).
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across the board—though it may be a reason to carefully select which
categories of immigrants can benefit from it.207
Furthermore, Congress already made the policy choice to assist certain
unauthorized immigrants because it wished to show mercy, or because
removal of these immigrants would do more harm than good. For example,
Congress passed legislation enabling crime victims to qualify for visas if they
assisted law enforcement because lawmakers prioritized deterring crime and
apprehending criminals over removing every person who violates
immigration laws.208 Similarly, Congress provides the remedy of cancellation
of removal because it recognized that a decade or more of presence in the
United States, coupled with the hardship that would be suffered by close
family members who are U.S. citizens or lawful residents, justifies overlooking
violations of immigration law.209 By adopting cooperative enforcement
techniques, the executive branch assists Congress in realizing these goals.
In any case, the charge of “rewarding lawbreakers” could be leveled
against the use of cooperative enforcement in any field, from occupational
safety to the taking of endangered animals. Landowners who violated
environmental regulations, or employers who did not meet OSHA standards,
or importers who brought tainted products into the United States are also
“lawbreakers,” just like unauthorized immigrants.210 The question is not
whether regulated entities break the law, but rather which regulatory policies
will most quickly and efficiently bring them into compliance, and ensure
compliance going forward. Proponents of cooperative enforcement believe
that a policy of working with regulated entities to assist them in complying
with regulatory goals is more efficient and effective than penalizing each and
every illegal act.211 The same is true in the context of unauthorized
immigration.

207. See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44
GA. L. REV. 65 (2009) (describing why some unauthorized immigrants are not to blame for their
illegal status).
208. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012)
(granting immigration visas to victims of certain crimes who meet other qualifications); id.
§ 101(a)(15)(T), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (granting immigration visas to victims of human
trafficking who meet other qualifications)
209. See Vasquez-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 343 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Congress did intend
some counterweight to the general policy of not rewarding extended illegal stays. Otherwise, there
would be no cancellation of removal proviso at all.”).
210. See supra notes 115–41 and accompanying text; see also Freeman, supra note 4, at 93
(describing objections to collaborative enforcement initiatives by the EPA and others, which
some feared would lead companies to “exploit such experiments in an effort to circumvent
environmental regulation to the maximum extent possible”).
211. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
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2. Incentivizing Illegal Immigration
Another serious critique of cooperative enforcement in immigration law
is that it could encourage more noncitizens to enter or remain in the United
States illegally. If immigration officials assist unauthorized immigrants to
obtain legal status, then noncitizens may decide to come illegally rather than
wait for a visa in their home country. Furthermore, if immigration officials
help unauthorized immigrants gain legal status after jumping the queue, they
will demoralize those immigrants who obey the law by applying and then
waiting years for their visas.212
If cooperative enforcement were equivalent to a blanket grant of amnesty
to all or most unauthorized immigrants, then it could incentivize immigrants
to come to the United States illegally. As explained in Part III, however,
cooperative enforcement would assist only those who qualify for existing
pathways to legal status, which, based on previous studies, is unlikely amount
to more than ten percent of the unauthorized population.213 Furthermore,
many of the laws allowing adjustment to legal status require that the
unauthorized immigrant has been brought into the United States as a child,
live in the United States for years, or have a close family relationship with U.S.
citizens or LPRs.214 Thus, even if immigration officials were to fully embrace
cooperative enforcement techniques, unauthorized immigrants would have
no easy or automatic route to legal status.
In any case, for most unauthorized immigrants the only real deterrent
would be the certainty of swift deportation. For noncitizens with powerful
incentives to come to the United States—such as those fleeing violence and
poverty in their home country—the ability to stay in the United States, legally
or not, is the real incentive to immigrate without permission.215 The
unauthorized immigrants who might benefit from cooperative enforcement
are unlikely to be removed from the United States in light of limited
enforcement resources.216 The Obama Administration announced that it

212. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
213. See Wong et al., supra note 9, at 289 (finding that 14.3% of the DACA-eligible population
was eligible for a more permanent form of relief).
214. See supra notes 190–92 and accompanying text.
215. Richard A. Boswell, Crafting an Amnesty with Traditional Tools: Registration and Cancellation,
47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175 (2010) (explaining that a limited amnesty is unlikely to encourage
future unauthorized immigration); Bill Ong Hing, The Case for Amnesty, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 233
(2007) (same).
216. For example, those who qualify for cancellation of removal have, by definition, lived in
the United States for over a decade, have no criminal record, and have a close family member
who is legally present in the United States. Those who might qualify for a waiver of the unlawful
presence bar have no serious criminal record and have a spouse, child, or parent who is a U.S.
citizen, and would suffer hardship from their absence. These categories of unauthorized
immigrants are low on the list of priorities for removal, as consistently stated in immigration
enforcement guidance memos stretching back to 2000. Memorandum from Doris Meissner,
supra note 58, at 1; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t,
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would prioritize the removal of convicted criminals and recent border
crossers, allowing most of the rest of the unauthorized population to
remain.217 Even President Trump has acknowledged the need to set
deportation priorities, backing away from an initial pledge to remove all 11.3
million unauthorized immigrants and instead stating that he will focus on
removing unauthorized immigrants with criminal backgrounds.218 Because
the unauthorized immigrants who could benefit from cooperative
enforcement face minimal risk of removal, the incentive to enter remain in
the United States without legal immigration status already exists.
3. Immigration Exceptionalism
Immigration is often viewed by scholars, practitioners, and even the
general public as fundamentally different from other areas of federal
regulation,219 and thus practices that work in other fields might be
inappropriate for immigration. Defenders of immigration exceptionalism
note that immigration impacts existential issues such as sovereignty, identity,
and national security.220 Courts are remarkably deferential to the government
in immigration cases, and have concluded in the past that regulation of
immigration is “exempt from the usual limits on government
decisionmaking.”221 As one scholar put it, “[i]mmigration law can seem to be
in its own world, divorced from the evolution of important legal concepts.”222
Arguably, then, a flexible and forgiving approach to immigration
enforcement might be incompatible with its central role defining and
protecting the nation.
As this critique suggests, whether cooperative enforcement is
appropriately applied to immigration turns in part on whether immigration
has an “exceptional position within the constitutional structure,” or

to All Field Office Dirs. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil
Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and
Removal of Aliens, supra note 72, at 1; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration
& Customs Enf’t, to All Field Office Dirs. et al., Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses,
and Plaintiffs, supra note 72, at 1; Memorandum from Julie L. Myers, supra note 72, at 1.
217. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All
Field Office Dirs. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens,
supra note 72, at 1.
218. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458, 461 (2009); see also Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration
Law, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 565, 566 (2012) (describing how “[i]mmigration law can seem to be in
its own world”); Motomura, supra note 15, 1363; Rosenbloom, supra note 15, at 1981–89;
Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 15, at 593.
220. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 219, at 461.
221. Motomura, supra note 15, at 1363.
222. Family, supra note 219, at 566.
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alternatively should be given an “ordinary place in administrative law.”223 If
immigration is considered to be just another area of federal regulation, like
environmental protection or workplace safety, then the same rules and
practices that govern in those areas should apply. If immigration is sui generis,
raising uniquely existential concerns and issues, then perhaps it calls for
uniquely strict enforcement.
These larger theoretical questions about role of immigration law cannot
be fully addressed within the confines of this Article. But it is worth noting
that immigration is not the only area of federal regulation that raises
existential concerns. Regulation of international trade, the environment,
energy, and transportation also affect national security and international
relations and can have profound effects on the future and well-being of the
country (indeed, the world). Yet these other fields are viewed as comfortably
within the administrative state and subject to administrative enforcement
norms.
In a related critique, some might argue that immigration is more closely
aligned with the criminal justice system than with the administrative state. The
lines between immigration and criminal law have blurred in recent years:
Criminal convictions often carry serious immigration consequences, and
some immigration violations are now federal crimes.224 If violations of
immigration law are crimes, or the moral equivalent of crimes, then arguably
the flexible and forgiving cooperative enforcement techniques are
inappropriate and send the wrong message to immigration violators.
Yet even in the criminal justice context the law is, at times, enforced
through methods akin to cooperative enforcement. Over the last few decades,
diversionary programs and specialized courts have sought to rehabilitate
offenders to bring them back into compliance with the law rather than
penalize them for their past transgressions.225 For example, drug courts often
“sentence” drug users or small-time dealers to a period of supervised
rehabilitation in which they are offered services and support to overcome
their addiction, enroll in school, and find employment.226 If they succeed,

223. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 219, at 461.
224. See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006) (describing how immigration and criminal law have converged over
the last 20 years).
225. Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement:
Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 439, 463–64 (1999) (describing the role of drug courts as intended to rehabilitate
rather than incarcerate drug offenders); Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and
Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1590–91 (2012) (describing the expansion
of specialized courts, which often serve to rehabilitate offenders and avoid incarceration).
226. See, e.g., Richard S. Gebelein, Delaware Leads the Nation: Rehabilitation in a Law and Order
Society; a System Responds to Punitive Rhetoric, 7 DEL. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2004) (describing drug courts
in Delaware); Martin I. Reisig, Rediscovering Rehabilitation: Drug Courts, Community Corrections and
Restorative Justice, 77 MICH. B.J. 172, 173–74 (1998) (describing drug courts in Michigan).
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they can sometimes avoid a conviction and jail time altogether.227 In both the
civil and criminal context, sometimes the best way to enforce the law is to help
the violator come into compliance rather than punish past transgressions.
Indeed, although this Article has argued that immigration officials should
adopt the cooperative enforcement techniques used by many administrative
agencies in other fields, it could have drawn upon the trend in alternatives to
incarceration in the criminal justice system to make the same point.
4. Antithetical to Attrition-Through-Enforcement Strategies
In a recent executive order, President Trump acknowledged the need to
set priorities by announcing that his administration would prioritize removal
of unauthorized immigrants who have committed crimes.228 In doing so, he
implicitly conceded that unauthorized immigrants living in the interior of the
United States who have not committed a crime will not be targeted for
removal, and thus are likely to remain unless they voluntarily choose to leave
the country or come to immigration officials’ attention for some other reason.
Theoretically, the Trump Administration might embrace cooperative
enforcement as an improvement over the removal-or-forbearance approach.
However, cooperative enforcement would likely be viewed as antithetical
to the policy of attrition through enforcement advocated by hardline
immigration restrictionists such as Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach and
the Center for Immigration Studies—both informal advisors to President
Trump.229 Proponents of attrition through enforcement argue that vigorous

227. In 1966 Congress passed the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, which “g[ave]
courts the authority to sentence drug addicts who violated Federal criminal laws to treatment
programs as an alternative to imprisonment.” Megan N. Krebbeks, One Step at a Time: Reforming
Drug Diversion Programs in California, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 417, 419 (2010); see also GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ADULT DRUG COURTS: STUDIES SHOW COURTS REDUCE RECIDIVISM BUT
DOJ COULD ENHANCE FUTURE PERFORMANCE MEASURE REVISION EFFORTS 21–22 (2011),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586793.pdf (detailing a study in which participation in drug
court diversion programs across varying jurisdictions throughout the United States significantly
reduced recidivism); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000 (West 2015) (allowing individuals who have
successfully completed drug diversion through the Deferred Entry of Judgment (DEJ) program
to withdraw the guilty pleas that were required before entry into the program); FLA. STAT.
§ 948.08 (2016) (allowing eligible individuals to participate in a program of substance abuse
education and treatment for a minimum of 90 days while their underlying criminal charges are
continued, and upon successful completion of the program, the underlying criminal charges are
dismissed without prejudice).
228. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (prioritizing the removal of
any unauthorized immigrant who has been convicted of, charged with, or “committed acts that
constitute a chargeable criminal offense”; or “pose[s] a risk to public safety or national security,”
but does not prioritize the removal of unauthorized immigrants solely on the basis of their lack
of documented status).
229. VAUGHAN, supra note 28, at 1; Walter Ewing, The Ideological Roots of Donald Trump’s Immigration
Team, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL: IMMIGR. IMPACT (Nov. 15, 2016), http://immigrationimpact.com/
2016/11/15/ideological-roots-donald-trumps-immigration-team; see also Kris W. Kobach, Attrition
Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 156
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enforcement of laws and policies will encourage unauthorized immigrants to
“self-deport,” as well as discourage new immigrants from coming without
permission, resulting in the gradual decrease in the unauthorized population
without the enormous cost and disruption of mass removals.230
Attrition through enforcement requires officials to ramp up immigration
enforcement and anti-immigration measures so that all unauthorized
immigrants are affected, including those who have not committed crimes and
who have lived in the United States for many years. Key components of such
a strategy include: “mandatory workplace verification of immigration status;
. . . partnerships with state and local law enforcement officials”; increased
removals of unauthorized immigrants who have not committed crimes; and
expansion of state and local laws hostile to unauthorized immigrants.231 As
Kobach put it, “if every illegal alien found it difficult to obtain employment in
the United States and the risks of enforcement (including the possibility of
detention during removal hearings) were to increase for all . . . [a]ttrition
through enforcement would occur.”232 Accordingly, he and other proponents
of attrition through enforcement would likely oppose assisting unauthorized
immigrants obtain legal status, since doing so might undermine the climate
of fear that would encourage unauthorized immigrants to leave.233
President Trump has yet to explicitly adopt attrition through
enforcement. Although at times his rhetoric embraces such policies, his
executive order prioritizing the removal of unauthorized immigrants who
have committed crimes is somewhat inconsistent with a philosophy that
requires threatening the detention and removal of each and every
unauthorized immigrant, no matter how sympathetic.234 Moreover, a policy of

(2008) (“Illegal aliens can be encouraged to depart the United States on their own, through a
concerted strategy of attrition through enforcement.”); Mark Krikorian, Downsizing Illegal Immigration:
A Strategy of Attrition Through Enforcement, BACKGROUNDER (Ctr. for Immigration Studies, Wash., D.C.),
May 2005, at 1, https://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2005/back605.pdf (advocating a policy
of enforcing immigration law to “[s]hrink the illegal population”).
230. Kobach, supra note 229, at 162 (arguing that attrition through enforcement is “relatively
inexpensive” as compared to mass deportations); VAUGHAN, supra note 28, at 7 (same). The
effectiveness of attrition through enforcement is disputed. The American Immigration Council and
other pro-immigrant groups argue that the United States has already spent billions on immigration
enforcement without good results because the current immigration laws are “unworkable.” See e.g., AM.
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE FALLACY OF “ENFORCEMENT FIRST”: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
WITHOUT IMMIGRATION REFORM HAS BEEN FAILING FOR DECADES 1 (2013), https://www.
americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_fallacy_of_enforcement_first.pdf.
231. VAUGHAN, supra note 28, at 1.
232. Kobach, supra note 229, at 157.
233. VAUGHAN, supra note 28, at 12 (“The strategy of attrition through enforcement
envisions a doubling of non-criminal removals, both to decrease the size of the illegal alien
population directly and to create a climate of enforcement that encourages voluntary compliance
as the likelihood of detection increases.”).
234. At times, President Trump’s rhetoric has suggested zero tolerance, but he has also
referred to some unauthorized immigrants, such as Dreamers, in sympathetic terms, calling them
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attrition through enforcement is not inherently incompatible with
cooperative enforcement. Immigration officials could both ramp up
detention and removals of unauthorized immigrants while at the same time
assisting those who are eligible to adjust to legal status. After all, proponents
of attrition through enforcement do not claim that there should be no
method by which unauthorized immigrants can adjust their status and, in any
case, they would have to acknowledge the law currently creates such
opportunities. Admittedly, however, the two approaches are in considerable
tension, and it seems unlikely that an administration that embraced one
technique in immigration enforcement would adopt the other.
B. BENEFITS OF COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT IN IMMIGRATION LAW
For those who conclude that cooperative enforcement is compatible with
the overarching goals of immigration law, there is much to recommend it.
Cooperative enforcement has the potential to reduce the size of the
unauthorized population efficiently and humanely, and in ways that are
legally sound and politically more palatable than the removal-or-forbearance
model employed today. In addition, cooperative enforcement could help to
bring immigration law back into the fold of mainstream administrative law,
possibly altering public perception of unauthorized immigrants in the
process.
1. Reducing the Size of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population
Cooperative enforcement, combined with removals and border security,
can assist immigration officials reduce the size of the unauthorized
population, and can do so more cheaply and effectively than the current
removal-or-forbearance approach. Immigration enforcement is typically
equated with the removal of unauthorized immigrants. But legalizing the
status of unauthorized immigrants also decreases the size of the unauthorized
population, and does so with less disruption to the community in which those
immigrants live and work.
The detention and removal of unauthorized immigrants from the
interior of the country costs about $23,480 per person235 and may deprive
U.S. citizen family members of financial support.236 In contrast, assisting that
same unauthorized immigrant to legalize his or her status will be far
cheaper—either revenue neutral (since many of the paths to legal status
require the recipient to pay fees that cover the administrative costs of
“terrific people” and hinting that his administration might find a way to allow them to remain in
the United States. Interview by Lesley Stahl with Donald J. Trump, supra note 19.
235. See Kasperkevic, supra note 47; see also Philip E. Wolgin, What Would it Cost to Deport All 5
Million Beneficiaries of Executive Action on Immigration?, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 23, 2015, 8:53
AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2015/02/23/106983/
what-would-it-cost-to-deport-all-5-million-beneficiaries-of-executive-action-on-immigration.
236. Wolgin, supra note 52.

A1_FROST.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

11/7/2017 2:28 PM

COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT IN IMMIGRATION LAW

47

processing the application), or even profitable (since studies show that
unauthorized immigrants earn more after obtaining employment
authorization and thus will pay more in taxes).237 For those immigrants with
U.S. citizen children, legalization is also less disruptive and more humane,
since it avoids the social and economic harm that ensues whenever parents
are forcibly removed from their children’s homes.
Cooperative enforcement may be particularly effective in immigration
because individual immigrants are in greater need of assistance to come into
compliance with the law than are regulated entities in other fields, such as
corporations and employers, who are likely to be repeat players and have
access to legal counsel. A surprising number of DACA applicants were found
to be eligible for more permanent forms of relief, which they only realized
when they consulted lawyers to assist them with their DACA applications.238
Many other unauthorized immigrants are also likely unaware that they are
eligible for pathways to legal status and thus would benefit from government
assistance.
2. Bringing Beneficiaries Out of the Shadows
Legalization is also an improvement over prosecutorial discretion, which
leaves unauthorized immigrants in “legal limbo”—and thus at risk of changes
in law or policy by the federal or state government—as well as vulnerable to
exploitation by employers and landlords.239 Many of the unauthorized
immigrants eligible to regularize their status are long-term, law-abiding
residents of the United States with close ties to U.S. citizens and LPRs, and
thus are low priorities for removal. But under the current removal-orforbearance approach, these unauthorized immigrants will spend a lifetime
in the United States without legal status—ever afraid of being deported,
unable to build secure lives or protect their own rights in the workplace and
at home, and degrading wages and working conditions for all employees.240

237. Tom K. Wong et al., Results from a Nationwide Survey of DACA Recipients Illustrate the Program’s
Impact, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (July 9, 2015, 12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/immigration/news/2015/07/09/117054/results-from-a-nationwide-survey-of-daca-recipientsillustrate-the-programs-impact (reporting that “after receiving DACA, 69 percent of [the survey’s]
respondents report[ed] moving to a job with better pay”).
238. Wong et al., supra note 9, at 289 (surveying 67 legal-service providers assisting applicants
for deferred action for childhood arrivals and finding that 14.3% of the unauthorized immigrants
applying for this temporary forbearance were also eligible for a more permanent form of relief).
239. Taylor, supra note 155, at 544.
240. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984) (observing that
exploitation of unauthorized immigrants in the workplace will degrade the wages and working
conditions of U.S. citizens); Nessel, supra note 99, at 347 (same); see also President Barack Obama,
Remarks on Immigration Reform (Jan. 29, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
president-obama-discusses-his-proposals-for-immigration-reform-transcript/2013/01/29/73074f9c-6
a3c-11e2-af53-7b2b2a7510a8_story.html (explaining that “the wages and working conditions of
American workers are threatened” by undocumented workers in the “shadow economy,” and that
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Some forms of prosecutorial discretion, such as deferred action, come
with permission to live and work in the United States for a set time period,
which provides some security and protection against exploitation.241 As the
United States v. Texas litigation illustrated, however, even these more durable
forms of prosecutorial discretion are at risk of reversal by the executive or
Congress, and the recipients may have to contend with hostile state
legislation.242 In any case, the beneficiaries of deferred action know that it is
temporary and can be terminated at any time. Enabling these unauthorized
immigrants to regularize their status would permanently bring unauthorized
immigrants “out of the shadows”—the stated goal of the Obama
Administration’s deferred action initiatives.243
3. Bipartisan Appeal
Cooperative enforcement can be tailored to fit the priorities of each
administration, and therefore should have a broader political appeal than the
categorical grants of deferred action favored by the Obama administration.
Even an administration that wishes to take a hard line against unauthorized
immigrants might recognize the desirability of helping a sympathetic subset
of the population adjust status.244 After all, any administration will have to
make choices about which groups of the unauthorized immigrant population
to prioritize for removal, acknowledging that the rest are likely to remain.
Only a president who is committed to ousting all 11.3 million unauthorized
immigrants—and who prefers to make life as uncomfortable as possible for
that population, regardless of the costs to U.S. citizens and legal residents who
live and work with them—would reject cooperative enforcement as
completely antithetical to his immigration policies.
Cooperative enforcement should also appeal to the executive because it
enables policymakers to make choices that cannot be easily undone by
Congress or a future administration, or by state legislation. President Obama
wanted to grant deferred action to a large subset of the unauthorized
population—those who were brought to the United States as children, as well
as parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs—amounting to one-third of the

businesses “trying to do the right thing [by] hiring people legally, paying a decent wage, following the
rules . . . [also] suffer”).
241. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text (describing deferred action).
242. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 12, at 5 (“An alien with deferred action remains
removable at any time, and DHS has absolute discretion to revoke deferred action unilaterally,
without notice or process.”).
243. Obama, supra note 67.
244. Michael Scherer, 2016 Person of the Year: Donald Trump, TIME, http://time.com/timeperson-of-the-year-2016-donald-trump (last visited Oct. 1, 2017) (reporting that Trump “made
clear he would like to find some future accommodation” for unauthorized immigrants brought
to the United States as children, whom he spoke of in sympathetic terms); Interview by Lesley
Stahl with Donald J. Trump, supra note 19 (same).
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unauthorized population.245 As a result of Texas’s successful legal challenge,
only his initiative for childhood arrivals went into effect. Even if Obama had
succeeded in granting deferred action to millions of unauthorized
immigrants, none of the recipients would have been protected from the
Trump Administration’s decision to rescind these programs. In contrast, the
cooperative enforcement approach provides unauthorized immigrants with a
tangible, permanent form of relief—one that often provides a pathway to
citizenship and could produce future voters eager to reward the party that
granted them legal status.
Cooperative enforcement is also on sounder legal footing than widescale
grants of deferred action. President Obama’s initiatives to grant deferred
action to a third of the unauthorized population were criticized as violating
the rule of law by unilaterally giving work authorization and a reprieve from
removal to millions whose presence in the United States violated federal
law.246 Texas and 25 other states sued the Obama Administration, arguing
that deferred action conflicted with the Immigration and Nationality Act, and
was also an abdication of the president’s constitutional obligation to “take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.”247 In contrast, cooperative
enforcement relies on existing laws to move unauthorized immigrants into
legal status, and thus cannot be challenged as an executive effort to bypass
existing laws.
4. Normalizing Immigration Law
Cooperative enforcement might also help bring immigration
enforcement policy back into the fold of mainstream administrative law
practice and tradition. Today, immigration law is frequently treated as
exceptional, and thus exempted from the norms of the administrative state,
which in turn means that immigration officials do not look to the practices of
other agency officials for guidance. The manner and method by which law is
enforced can have an expressive value.248 If immigration officials were to
embrace the enforcement policies of other administrative agencies, it would
help to send the message that immigration is similar to other regulatory fields,
such as the regulation of the environment, the workplace, or imported
products, and that the regulatory initiatives that succeed in those fields also
have a place in immigration enforcement.
Bringing immigration law back under the umbrella of the administrative
state might even alter the public’s perception of unauthorized immigrants.
Unauthorized immigrants are often viewed as dangerous criminals, even
though most immigration violations are not crimes, and even though

245.
246.
247.
248.

See supra Part I.
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 12, at 5.
See supra Part I.
See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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immigrants are less likely to commit crimes than the general population.249
The public also tends to view immigrants in binary terms: They are either legal
and thus “good,” or illegal and thus “bad.” But in fact, immigrants can shift in
and out of legal status, as a number of federal laws recognize.250 If cooperative
enforcement became the norm, it might change the public’s impression of
the unauthorized population as permanently tainted by their illegal status.
Rather than criminals who must be expelled from the United States, they
could be viewed as temporary lawbreakers who can be rehabilitated—much
like other regulated entities who sometimes break the law and then benefit
from assistance by federal regulators.
V.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. immigration bureaucracy has approached immigration
enforcement as though there were only two choices: removal or forbearance.
Although immigration officials spend enormous resources detaining and
deporting unauthorized immigrants, historically they have not been able to
remove more than about 4% of the unauthorized population each year.251 As
a result, immigration officials classify much of the unauthorized population
as low priorities for removal and do not actively seek to remove them. But this
removal-or-forbearance approach has only exacerbated the nation’s
unauthorized immigration crisis, in which the size of the unauthorized
population has ballooned even as immigration officials deport a record
number of noncitizens.
This Article proposes that immigration authorities supplement the
removal-or-forbearance dichotomy with a cooperative enforcement
approach, using techniques that have been embraced by other administrative
agencies. Under such an approach, immigration officials would work with a
subset of unauthorized immigrants to help them regularize their status
through a combination of education and outreach, assistance, flexible
application of legal standards, and the liberal use of discretion. In doing so,
immigration officials would be following the lead of multiple federal agencies
that have abandoned an adversarial, punitive style of regulation for softer,
more collaborative methods of promoting compliance. Just as regulators at
the EPA, FDA, SEC, and OSHA have realized that it is more efficient and
effective to work together with regulated entities to achieve their overall goals,

249. Walter Ewing et al., The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL
(July 23, 2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/criminalizationimmigration-united-states (describing the “stereotype” that immigrants are more likely to be
criminals, but observing that the crime rate for both authorized and unauthorized immigrants is
lower than the crime rate for the native-born population).
250. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2048 (2008)
(noting that many unauthorized immigrants can eventually obtain legal status).
251. The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens
Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, supra note 12, at 1.
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immigration officials could reduce the unauthorized population at a lower
cost—both in terms of dollars and societal disruption—if they sought to help
unauthorized immigrants access existing pathways to legal status.
Although cooperative enforcement would not solve the nation’s
unauthorized immigration problems, it would provide a permanent solution
for those unauthorized immigrants who are a low priority for removal in any
presidential administration: long-term unauthorized immigrants with close
U.S. citizen or LPR family members and without criminal records.
Cooperative enforcement can be tailored to accommodate the immigration
priorities of any administration—whether Republican or Democrat—which
recognizes that removal of all or most of the 11.3 million unauthorized
immigrants in the United States is not a realistic possibility. In addition,
because cooperative enforcement uses existing laws permitting the shift from
illegal to legal status, it avoids the charge of lawlessness leveled against
President Obama’s wide-scale use of prosecutorial discretion.
Finally, cooperative enforcement would be a small step toward bringing
immigration back into the fold of mainstream administrative law. Federal
regulators have seen the benefit of working together with regulated entities
in fields such as environmental protection and workplace safety to help them
meet federal standards; they should take the same approach to unauthorized
immigrants, who would welcome the opportunity to legalize their status if only
they knew how to do so.

